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IN THE WAKE OF THE TAMPA: CONFLICTING VISIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW IN THE
MANAGEMENT OF REFUGEE FLOWS
Mary Crockt
Abstract: The Australian Government's decision in August 2001 to close its
doors to a maritime Good Samaritan, Norwegian Captain Rinnan, his crew, and 433
Afghan and Iraqi rescuees, provided a curious contrast to the image of humanity,
generosity, and openness that Australia tried so hard to foster during the 2000 Olympic
Games in Sydney. Victims or villains according to how the facts and the law are
characterized, the MI/V Tampa rescuers represented for lawyers the intersection of a
variety of areas of law and a clash of legal principles. The ambiguities in both
international and state law pertaining to asylum seekers and refugees give rise to
questions of state responsibility.
The stand taken by Australia set a precedent that, if followed by other refugee
receiving countries, could only worsen the already deplorable problems facing asylum
seekers in the world today. The immediate Australian response to the Tampa Affair was
a rash of legislative amendments to Australia's 1958 Migration Act that stifled appeals to
federal.courts and granted officers a broad range of power over rescuers within and
outside of Australia's territorial jurisdiction. Australia has also responded with
"Operation Relex" and the "Pacific Solution" which have not only been inadequate to
address the needs of the rescuers, but have arguably violated both state and international
law. The conflicting interpretations of the law-both domestic and international-that
have emerged in the wake of the Tampa may be testament to the inadequacies of the legal
framework for the protection of refugees.
I. POINTS OF DEPARTURE
The decision by the Australian Government to close its doors to sea-
borne asylum seekers, or "boat people," in August 2001 took many people
by surprise.' Perhaps it was the nature of the incident that led to the
t B.A. (Hons.) L.L.B. (Hos.) Ph.D. (Melb.), Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Sydney; Chair,
Nationality and Residence Committee, International Law Section, Law Council of Australia. This Article
is based on various lectures and seminars Professor Crock has delivered on the subject of the Tampa
Incident, but was prepared first and foremost for the Symposium held at the University of Washington,
Seattle, Australia's Tampa Incident: The Convergence of International Domestic and Refugee and
Maritime Law in the Pacific Rim, in April 2002. Mary Crock also authored a second article on the Tampa
Incident, entitled Mary Crock, Durable Solutions or Politics of Misery? Refugee Protection in Australia
After the Tampa, in FENCED IN: BORDER PROTECTION, ASYLUM AND DETENTION IN AUSTRALIA (Michael
Darcy ed., forthcoming). Thanks are due to Edwin Abuya, Ben Saul, and Ed Santow for research
assistance, and to the following people who provided commentary on drafts of this paper: Guy Goodwin-
Gill, Don Rothwell, Penelope Mathew, Michael Head, Veronica Taylor, Jessica E. Tauman, Ron
McCallum, Ellen Hansen and Marissa Bandharangshi. Any errors that remain and opinions expressed are
the author's own.
Donald Rothwell provides the following account of the events that began the Tampa Affair:
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precipitous change of policy: the refusal to allow a maritime Good
Samaritan to off-load his distressed and weary "rescuees
' '2 onto Australian
soil made for fine drama. The implacable hardness of the Australian
authorities and the shrill xenophobia of the Australian public throughout the
Tampa Affair3 provided a curious contrast to the image of humanity,
generosity, and openness that Australia tried so hard to foster during the
2000 Olympic Games in Sydney. Even as more serious events unfold to
threaten global security, it is right that the Tampa Incident should continue
to concern us. The stand taken by Australia in August 2001 set a precedent
that, if followed by other refugee receiving countries, could only worsen the
already deplorable problems facing asylum seekers in the world today. The
incident is also a vivid reminder of how easy it is to sow seeds of fear and
hate in a society, even in a country that prides itself on its respect for human
rights and the rule of law.4
On 26 August 2001, the Australian Search and Rescue organization assisted in the
coordination of a search and rescue operation in the Indian Ocean for the Palapa 1, an
Indonesian flagged ship carrying 433 people. The Norwegian flagged roll on/roll off
container ship, M/V Tampa, responded to this request and with the assistance of the
Australian authorities was guided to the sinking vessel where it successfully carried out
the rescue operation. Immediately following the rescue, the Tampa headed towards the
Indonesian port of Merak, some 246 nautical miles to the north. However, approximately
four hours into this voyage, the Tampa reversed course and began steaming south
towards the Australian territory of Christmas Island, which had only been 75 nautical
miles south of where the original rescue had taken place. Later that evening the master of
the Tampa, Captain Rinnan, was asked by Australian authorities to change course for
Indonesia and threatened that if he did enter Australia's territorial sea with the intention
of offloading the persons rescued from the Palapa 1 that he would be subject to
prosecution under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) for people smuggling. This
communication gave the first clear indication of the position the Australian Government
was taking towards the Tampa and set the tone for the Australian Government's legal and
policy response over the course of the next week.
See Donald Rothwell, The Law of the Sea and the M/V Tampa Incident: Reconciling Maritime Principles
with Coastal State Sovereignty, 13 PuB. L. REV. 118, 118 (2002). For another account, see James C.
Hathaway, Immigration Law is Not Refugee Law, in U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE
SURVEY 38-45 (2001).
2 "Rescuees" is the term coined by Judge North in the Australian Federal Court in the litigation
brought by public interest advocates in the Tampa Incident. See Vadarlis v. Ruddock (2001) 110 F.C.R.
452, 457, overruled by Ruddock v. Vadarlis (2001) 110 F.C.R. 491. Judge North explained his choice of
word as an attempt to fird a neutral (and non-emotive) term to describe the people at the heart of the
incident. See id.
3 The "Tampa Incident" and the "Tampa Affair" refer to the same incident and are used
interchangeably throughout this Article.
4 A great deal has now been written about the Tampa Affair and the way in which the Australian
people responded to the abrupt change in the Government's policies. See, e.g., PETER MARES,
BORDERLINE: AUSTRALIA'S RESPONSE TO REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE WAKE OF THE TAMPA
(UNSW Press 2d ed. 2002) (2001); JAMES JUPP, FROM WHITE AUSTRALIA TO WOOMERA: THE STORY OF
AUSTRALIAN IMMIGRATION (2002); Penelope Mathew, Australian Refugee Protection in the Wakes of the
Tampa, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 661 (2002) [hereinafter Mathew, Australian Refugee Protection]; Penelope
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From the perspective of international refugee law, the Tampa Incident
and its aftermath present a fascinating example of how the adoption of
different perspectives can produce diametrically opposing visions of both the
law and the justice of actions taken. Insofar as the various visions are
capable of producing dramatically different outcomes, the incident also
illustrates the limitations inherent in international refugee law where the
mechanisms that exist to enforce particular outcomes are patently
inadequate.
This Article examines the differing constructions of international law
that have been introduced to either condemn or condone the actions taken by
the Australian Government to prevent the off-loading of the Tampa rescuees
on Australian territory. While allowing for differences that have emerged in
the description of the factual events of the incident involving the Tampa in
late August 2001, the applicable law is more remarkable for its ambiguities
than for the light it sheds on the events in question. Part II of the Article
briefly sketches the arguments made under international maritime law before
turning to a consideration of international refugee law. The discussion of
refugee law begins by looking at the significance of the status of the
rescuees as asylum seekers who had yet to articulate claims to be refugees.
After examining the issue of which country or countries had responsibility
for the rescuees, Part II considers the nature of the different obligations
imposed on States Parties to the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees ("Refugee Convention") relative to the geographical situation of
refugees.
The Tampa Affair was followed by what the Australians dubbed
"Operation Relex" and the "Pacific Solution." When Australia refused to
land the Tampa rescuees, arrangements were made to divert these and other
"boat people" interdicted en route to Australia back to Indonesia, to New
Zealand, and to the Pacific islands of Nauru and Manus Island in Papua New
Guinea ("PNG"). All persons taken in as part of the Pacific Solution have
Mathew, Legal Issues Concerning Interception (Oct. 25, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) [hereinafter Mathew, Legal Issues]. For a discussion of the incident within the context of
constitutional and human rights law, see 13 PUB. L. REv. (2002) (special issue devoted to the Tampa
Affair).
The leading international instruments are the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees and its attendant Protocol. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature
July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, A.T.S. 1954/5 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954)
[hereinafter Refugee Convention]; United Nations Protocol to the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6224(E), 6230(F), 606 U.N.T.S. 267, A.T.S.
1973/37 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter Protocol]. The Refugee Convention covers events
causing a refugee problem before January 1, 1951, while the Protocol extends the definition to events
occurring after that date.
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had or are having their status as refugees determined. Processing of the
Tampa rescuees and some other asylum seekers 6 was undertaken by New
Zealand, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR"),
and the International Office for Migration ("IOM"). 7  The other asylum
seekers who arrived on boats following the Tampa Affair had their refugee
claims determined by Australian officials operating on Nauru and Manus
Island. The asylum seekers detained on Nauru and Manus Island have not
been given access to legal advice or other assistance. One rationale behind
this scheme appears to be an attempt to reproduce, as closely as possible, the
rudimentary processing regime used in UNHCR field operations in
situations of refugee crises. 8  Part III examines the different legal
constructions that have been placed on these arrangements and challenges
the Australian Government's view that its "solution" represents a principled
response to the management of "secondary refugee flows."
The radically changed policy adopted by Australia in September 2001
is extraordinary within the context of international state practice, but it is not
unique. In many respects, Australia modeled both its interdiction program
and "offshore" arrangements to process the refugee claims of those taken
into custody on the system of the United States. Part III explores the
parallels between Australia and the United States in the immediate aftermath
of the Tampa Incident, examining the way in which both countries have used
the ambiguities of international law to assert the dominance of their
domestic laws.
The final phase of the Tampa Incident is what might be described as
the "durable solution" end of the story. In early April 2002, the UNHCR
and Australia began releasing decisions on Nauru and Manus Island. As
individuals come to gain recognition as refugees, questions arise about who
will take the refugees and on what terms. Part IV of this Article, discusses
who should have ultimate responsibility for the resettlement of those
recognized as refugees on Nauru and Manus Island. Once again, the picture
6 The Tampa rescuees-most of whom were fleeing from Afghanistan and Iraq-were eventually
taken on board an Australian troopship, the HMAS Manoora, and transferred to Nauru. See Tom Allard &
Mark Metherell, Australia Leans on Nauru to Process Latest Asylum Seekers, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
Sept. 10, 2001, http://old.smh.com.au/news/0109/l0/national/nationall.html. During the voyage to Nauru,
the Manoora collected another group of asylum seekers, primarily Iraqis, from an Indonesian vessel called
the Aceng. Id.
' For a discussion of the role that the IOM has played in the resolution of the Tampa Affair, see By
Invitation Only: Australian Asylum Policy, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Dec. 2002, at 51-52, 71-73
[hereinafter By Invitation Only].
8 See id.; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, People Smuggling-
Australia's Experience and Policy Responses-A Background Paper, http://www.minister.imni.gov.au/
borders/detention/peoplesmugg 2.htm (last updated July 22, 2002) [hereinafter People Smuggling
Background Paper].
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that emerges is one of political considerations overriding any pure
application of the rule of law.
II. DECONSTRUCTING THE TAMPA INCIDENT
A. Tampa Politics: Playing Games with the Law or Constructing
Different Legal Realities?
The standoff between Captain Rinnan of the Tampa and the
Australian Government in late August 2001 was first and foremost a human
and political drama. The Norwegian captain responded to the humanitarian
crisis of the sinking Palapa I both by bringing the rescuees on to his ship,
and by acceding to their requests to proceed towards the Australian territory
of Christmas Island rather than to Indonesia. He sailed unwittingly into a
political storm when the Australian Government used the incident to take a
stand against unauthorized boat arrivals.
The electoral popularity of the Australian Government's actions in
refusing admission to the Tampa grew exponentially after the terrorist
attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. The confluence of this
incident with the events in the United States spawned (at least) two legal
dramas. The first was the litigation instituted by public interest lawyers in
Melbourne in a vain attempt to force the Australian Government to "land"
the rescuees and to permit them to lodge asylum claims.9 The second was
the rash of legislation presented to Parliament and passed with barely half a
day of debates on September 26, 2001.10 The outcomes in both instances
reflected the overwhelming force of a panicked electorate led by a
government prepared to run with, and even encourage, the fears of the
populace-to its considerable political advantage. The Tampa Affair
marked the beginning of a concerted and ultimately divisive campaign
9 See Vadarlis v. Ruddock (2001) 110 F.C.R. 452, overruled by Ruddock v. Vadarlis (2001) 110
F.C.R. 493. Although an appeal was instituted in the High Court, leave to appeal was denied on the basis
that the distribution of the Tampa rescuees between New Zealand and Nauru had rendered the dispute
moot, with the subjects of the litigation having passed beyond the control of the Australian courts. See
Vadarlis v. Ruddock, High Court Transcript, No. M93 of 2001 (Nov. 27, 2001) (review denied by the
Australian High Court).
'0 See Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act, 2001 (Austl.); Migration
Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act, 2001 (Austl.); Migration
Legislation Amendment Act, No. 1, 2001 (Austl.); Migration Legislation Amendment Act, No. 3, 2001
(Austi.); Migration Legislation Amendment Act, No. 5, 2001 (Austl.); Migration Legislation Amendment
Act, No. 6, 2001 (Austl.); and Migration (Judicial Review) Act, 2001 (Austl.). These measures were
opposed only by the Democrats, the Greens, and independent Senator Brian Harradine. For an account, see
Mary Crock, Echoes of the Old Countries or Brave New Worlds: Legal Responses to Refugees and Asylum
Seekers in Australia and New Zealand, 14 REv. QUtBtCOISE DROrT INT'L 55 (2001).
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against asylum seekers generally and boat people in particular,"' culminating
in a federal election that saw the incumbent government returned with a
handsome majority.12
If the politics of the Tampa help to explain the popular fixation on the
events as they unfolded in 2001, the Incident has proved endlessly
fascinating for aficionados of law and legal theory. The standoff between
Australia's Special Armed Services and Captain Rinnan occurred at sea,
within three nautical miles of Christmas Island. The rescuees were within
Australia's maritime territory, but had not touched the soil defined in
domestic legislation as Australia's "migration zone."' 3 The rescuees plainly
wanted to claim asylum in Australia,14 but they had no papers to prove that
they were refugees as defined under the Refugee Convention. 5 Under
international law of the sea, the rescuees could be characterized as victims.
Under Australian domestic law, the absence of visas or other evidence of a
right to enter rendered them villains.
Victims or villains according to how the facts and the law are
characterized, the Tampa rescuees represented for lawyers the intersection of
a variety of areas of law and a clash par excellence of legal principles. At
the same time, the affair also represents a fascinating case study of how
' For a detailed account of Operation Relex, see infra Part III.
12 The tactics threw the Opposition Labor Party into disarray. In the words of John Button:
The most profoundly disillusioning event in 2001 for those who believed in a
humanitarian and compassionate Labor Party was its response to the Tampa incident and
the engineered refugee crisis. People searched in vain for a sign of difference between
the ALP and the Coalition ... there was none....
The Labor leadership had overlooked the fact that the potentially explosive issue of
"boat people" had been on the public agenda since early in (2001). As a result they were
left stunned and flat-footed. No alternative was suggested. It didn't seem to matter that
the platform of the party, updated at the National Conference in August 2001, contained a
clear and compassionate statement of principle in relation to asylum seekers and refugees
The ALP was caught in the headlights, frozen between the sentiment of the national
platform and belief in compassionate, humane values on the one hand and opinion polls
on the other. Labor's confusion was ruthlessly exploited by Howard and his henchmen
Reith, Costello and Ruddock. Howard played two cards, one of which seemed
suspiciously like racism, the other involving a spurious appeal to a bus-stop
egalitarianism. This second card said: these people are not victims but selfish "queue
jumpers" unprepared to wait for entry to the promised land. Australians, sometimes
uncertain about their own motives, were provided with an alibi: I'm not a racist, just a
fervent believer in queues.
See John Button, Beyond Belief What Future for Labor?, 6 Q. ESSAY 1, 16-17 (2002).
13 Migration Act 1958, § 5 (Austl.).
14 This was made clear when the Norwegian ambassador to Australia boarded the Tampa and was
handed a letter from the rescuees. See Vadarlis 110 F.C.R. at 459.
"5 See infra Part II.C.
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formalistic characterizations of the rule of law can be manipulated to achieve
different outcomes.
B. The Tampa Incident, the Law of the Sea, and International Maritime
Law
Legal issues arose under international maritime law for the simple
reason that these were the frameworks that governed Captain Rinnan's
immediate behavior when he first encountered the sinking Palapa L As
Rothwell and others have pointed out, 16 Captain Rinnan's response in taking
over 400 rescuees on board the Tampa exceeded his international legal
obligations under the international law of the sea: the Tampa was only
licensed to carry fifty people and equipped for fewer still. Christmas Island
being the closest landfall from the point of rescue, there are also strong
grounds for arguing that the law of the sea entitled him to unload the rescued
persons there. 17  Conversely, Australia's behavior in boarding and taking
control of the Tampa, together with its closure of Flying Fish Cove are
difficult to justify. Although the Norwegian captain was threatened with
fines as a people smuggler, he clearly did not fit this description. Given the
state of the rescuees and Captain Rinnan's belief that he would soon have
deaths on board if medical assistance was not obtained, there are strong
grounds for arguing that the legal principles of necessity andforce majeure
justified his insistence on pursuing landfall on Christmas Island.'
8
Australia's answer to these arguments was to assert that the usual
practice in situations of maritime emergencies is for the vessel taking on
rescued persons to continue on its planned route as nearly as possible,
disembarking rescuees at a convenient port. In this instance, an Australian
immigration official stated that Merak in Indonesia was appropriate. 9 The
port of Merak is situated in the same general direction as the Tampa's
original planned route to Singapore and has a harbor rated to take a vessel
t6 See Rothwell, supra note 1, at 120-21. For other accounts of the international law of the sea issues
raised by the Tampa Incident, see Jessica E. Tauman, Comment, Rescued at Sea, but Nowhere to Go: The
Cloudy Legal Waters of the Tampa Crisis, I1 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 461, 477-78 (2002); Jean-Pierre
Fonteyne, All Adrift in a Sea of Illegitimacy: An International Law Perspective on the Tampa Affair, 12
PU. L. REv. 249 (2001). See generally Martin Davies, Obligations and Implications for Ships
Encountering Persons in Need of Assistance at Sea, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 109 (2003); and Frederick
J. Kenney, Jr. & Vasilios Tasikas, The Tampa Incident: IMO Perspectives and Responses on the Treatment
of Persons Rescued at Sea, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 143 (2003).
17 See 2 D.P. O'CoNrNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 855-57 (Ivan Searer ed. 1984).
'8 See Rothwell, supra note 1, at 123-24.
'9 Interview with Robert Illingworth, Deputy Secretary, Refugee Policy Branch, Department of
Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [hereinafter DIMIA], in Sydney, Austl. (Apr. 2, 2002)
[hereinafter April Interview with Robert Illingworth].
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the size of the Tampa.20 Australia's actions at each stage were defended as
being consistent with its status as a sovereign nation whose national security
is dependant on control of its borders.
C. International Refugee Law, State Responsibility, and the "Right" to
Seek Asylum
The picture becomes more complex when the frame of reference is
altered so as to view the events through the portal of international refugee
law. It was apparent from very early in the standoff that the Tampa rescuees
wished to seek asylum in Australia on the basis that they were refugees. 21
Throughout the initial crisis period their status as refugees had not been
determined. At best they could be characterized as "asylum seekers." The
basic problem facing refugee claimants is that the Refugee Convention does
not provide a right to claim asylum. This point has been made forcefully by
Justice Gummow:
First, it has long been recognized that, according to customary
international law, the right of asylum is a right of States, not of
the individual; no individual, including those seeking asylum,
may assert a right to enter the territory of a State of which that
individual is not a national .... The proposition that every
State has competence to regulate the admission of aliens at will
was applied in Australian municipal law from the earliest days
of this Court. . . . However, from that proposition, two
principles of customary international law have followed. One
is that a State is free to admit anyone it chooses to admit, even
at the risk of inviting the displeasure of another State; and the
other is that, because no State is entitled to exercise corporeal
control over its nationals on the territory of another State, such
individuals are safe from further persecution unless the asylum
State is prepared to surrender them .... A corollary is that, in
the absence of an extradition treaty, the asylum State has no
international obligation to surrender fugitives to the State from
20 Flying Fish Cove on Christmas Island is not rated to dock a vessel with the dimensions of the
Tampa. Id. Robert Illingworth, Deputy Secretary of DIMIA, asserted in April 2002 that Tampa Captain
Arne Rinnan was obliged to keep the ship under power during the stand-off with the Australian authorities
because of the inability to anchor the ship off Christmas Island. Id.
21 The Afghans on board the Tampa made their intentions clear to the Norwegian ambassador who
visited the ship at its Christmas Island mooring. See Hathaway, supra note 1, at 39.
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which they have fled... and the fugitives are protected against
the exercise of jurisdiction by that State.22
However, even if the Tampa rescuees had no right to seek asylum in
Australia, the fact that their refugee status had not been determined at the
time of their interception at sea did not mean that the Refugee Convention
offered them no succor. Under the Refugee Convention, the status of
refugee is not "created" by any determination process. People either are, or
are not, refugees depending on the applicability of the definition of refugee
at a particular point in time. Put another way, the obligations imposed by
the Refugee Convention are not dependant on refugees having their status
23recognized. The burning issue in the Tampa standoff, therefore, was not so
much the status of each of the rescuees, or their right to claim asylum.
Rather, it was the extent and nature of Australia's obligations, assuming that
the group included refugees (as defined in the Refugee Convention).24
Given the fact that the Tampa rescuees were mainly from Afghanistan,25
where the feared Taliban was still in power, such an assumption could
hardly be described as far-fetched. This point was made by Justice North in
the initial ruling in the Tampa litigation, stating:
It is notorious that a significant proportion of asylum seekers
from Afghanistan processed through asylum status systems
qualify as refugees under the Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees 1951 done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 (the
22 See Ruddock v. Ibrahim (2000) 204 C.L.R. 1, 45-46 (footnotes omitted).
23 See UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS
UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES,
HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (1979) [hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK]. The Handbook provides, at paragraph 28:
A person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as he fulfils the
criteria contained in the definition. This would necessarily occur prior to the time at
which his refugee status is formally determined. Recognition of his refugee status does
not therefore make him a refugee but declares him to be one. He does not become a
refugee because of recognition, but is recognised because he is a refugee.
Id. 24 See Hathaway, supra note 1, a 41.
25 Many of the Tampa rescuees were Afghan nationals. 434 Boat People Rescued From Crippled
Indonesian Ferry, AAP NEWSFEED, Aug. 27, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, Australia Publications. Before
the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan lead to the defeat of the ruling Taliban in late 2001, over 60% of
Afghan asylum seekers in Australia were gaining recognition as refugees. Trends in Asylum Decisions in
38 Countries, 1999-2000, UNHCR, June 22, 2001, tbl. 9, at 18/46, http://www.unhcr.ch (last visited Jan.
10, 2003). Of the 130 Tampa asylum seekers accepted by New Zealand, all but one were recognised at first
instance as refugees and offered permanent resettlement. Christopher Niesche, Afghans Find Hope in NZ,
WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, Feb. 2, 2002, LEXIS, News Library.
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Refugees Convention). Once assessed as refugees, this means
that they are recognized as persons fleeing fro pcrsccution in
Afghanistan. While such people no doubt make decisions
about their lives, those decisions should be seen against the
background of the pressures generated by flight from
persecution.2
6
Arguments have raged over which country had primary responsibility for the
Tampa asylum seekers, qua refugees. Australia asserts that Indonesia, as
country of embarkation, should have agreed to take them back.27  Although
Indonesia is not a State Party to the Refugee Convention, the argument runs,
the predominantly Muslim identity of the rescuees meant that in practical
terms they would not face persecution in that country. In fact, Indonesia had
been offering (and continues to offer) de facto protection to asylum seekers
from Afghanistan and the Middle East. The problem with this argument is
that the Tampa rescuees had never been lawfully present in Indonesia, and
there was, therefore, no basis in international law or any other law for an
obligation of any kind to re-admit individuals who had left its shores in such
circumstances.
James Hathaway argues that Norway and Australia had primary
responsibility for the Tampa rescuees: the former because it was the flag
State of the rescue vessel, and the latter because of the presence of the
rescuees in its territorial waters.2 8 There is some evidence of state practice
to support the first of these claims, but probably not enough to assert that
customary international law has developed to the point of always ascribing
such responsibility to flagship states. On this occasion, the Tampa was a
Norwegian ship in the sense that it was sailing under a Norwegian flag.
However, it was a commercial shipping liner and, as such, could not be
characterized as a state vessel to which the full range of state responsibilities
under international law might apply.
29 Moreover, as many acknowledge,
30
26 See Vadarlis v. Ruddock (2001) 110 F.C.R. 452, 471, overruled by Ruddock v. Vadarlis (2001)
110 F.C.R. 491.
27 April Interview with Robert Illingworth, supra note 19.
21 See Hathaway, supra note 1, at 41, n. 11.
29 See R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 257-63 (Juris Publishing 3d ed. 1999)
(1983) (discussing the nationality of ships).
30 See GuY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 158 (Oxford U. Press 2d ed.
1996) (1983). Professor Goodwin-Gill stresses the responsibility of the state of "first port of call," rather
than asserting obligations in the flag states of rescue vessels. Id.; see also R.P. Schaeffer, The Singular
Plight of Sea-borne Refugees, 8 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 213 (1978-80); and James Z. Pugash, Comment, The
Dilemma of the Sea Refugee: Rescue Without Refuge, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 577 (1977). Both articles
chronicle the arrangements made following the outflow of boat people from Vietnam after the fall of
Saigon to the North Vietnamese. See also Tauman, supra note 16.
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state practice has varied greatly at the height of refugee crises involving
fugitives taking to boats in any numbers. 31  If any precedent exists for
flagship states taking responsibility for refugees rescued at sea, the countries
involved have generally been geographically proximate to the scene of the
rescue, and have been willing to participate in a management program.
32
Arguments that Australia had primary responsibility for the rescuees
stress several factors in the Affair: the proximity of Christmas Island to the
rescue site, the involvement of the Australian authorities in the initial search
and rescue operation, and, ultimately, the presence of the Tampa within
Australian territorial waters. Hathaway argues with some force that States
Parties to the Refugee Convention cannot as a matter of law avoid their
obligations by adopting "mechanistic" strategies to avoid the assumption of
responsibility.33 In this respect, Hathaway groups together both the physical
expulsion of the Tampa and its human cargo, and the legislative measures
taken to nominally remove Australian jurisdiction by excising Christmas
Island and like external territories from Australia's "migration zone.
3 4
1. The Non-Refoulement Obligation
Arguments about who did and did not have jurisdiction over or
responsibility for the Tampa rescuees are inevitably linked to questions
about the rights of asylum seekers and the responsibilities owed to them.
The problem facing sea-born asylum seekers is the limitations inherent in the
rights regime contained in the Refugee Convention. While the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights decreed that every person should have a right
to seek and to enjoy asylum from persecution, 35 this right is conspicuously
absent from the Refugee Convention. This is not to say, however, that the
latter instrument offers no protection to asylum seekers.
In her discussion of Australia's new interdiction regime, 36 Dr.
Penelope Mathew takes issue with the view that Australia's obligations
31 Tauman provides examples of some of the more egregious instances of humanitarian neglect,
amongst them the tragedies of the St. Louis-which resulted in the ultimate death of 907 refugees from
Nazi Germany; of the Struma-where 769 Romanian Jews were left to drown; and of the Vietnamese boat
people who were left by a United States naval vessel to die of starvation in the South China Seas. See
Tauman, supra note 16, at 461-62, 492-93.
32 See Schaeffer, supra note 30; and Pugash, supra note 30.
33 See Hathaway, supra note 1.
34 Id. at 41. See also Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act, No. 127, 2001
(Austl.). For a discussion of the legislative changes "excising" certain off-shore territories from Australia's
migration zone, see infra note 132 and accompanying text; and Crock, supra note 10.
35 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (Dec. 10, 1948), G.A. Res. 217A(II), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., art. 14, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
36 See Mathew, Legal Issues, supra note 4.
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under the Refugee Convention are only engaged when a refugee has
"entered" the c..it-.. 3 7 She po;Its out that while some parts of the Refugee
Convention are predicated clearly on a refugee being physically present in
the territory of a State Party, this is not true of all articles. Article 33(1) for
example provides that:
No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion.
This Article prohibits states from expelling or returning refugees to a place
of persecution. While expulsion may imply prior entry into a country, the
reference to return is broader and does not require a notion of physical
presence in state territory. Mathew uses the words of Article 33 to argue
that Australia's obligations towards the Tampa rescuees were engaged as
soon as these people came within the territorial waters and control, of
Australia. She posits further that the obligation to ensure against
refoulement extended beyond Australia's immediate dealings with the
rescuees to prohibit "chain" refoulement. She writes:
If this were not so, the parties to the Convention could simply
avoid their obligations by sending an asylum-seeker to another
country which was not party to the Refugee Convention and
which would not observe the obligation of non-refoulement. In
turn, this would make a mockery of the ordinary meaning of the
words "return" and "in any manner whatsoever." The
obligation of non-refoulement is both an obligation of result and
an obligation of conduct, and there is no break in the chain of
causation when a State has failed to ensure that an asylum-
seeker receives protection from refoulement elsewhere.
Accordingly, the State will bear joint responsibility for the fate
of the asylum-seeker as a matter of international law.38
7 This view is advanced in Ryszard Piotrowicz & Samuel K.N. Blay, The Case of M/V Tampa: State
and Reu gee Rights Collide at Sea, 76 AUSTL. L. J. 12, 15 (2002).
Yu See Mathew, Legal Issues, supra note 4, at 8-9, citing James Crawford & Patricia Hyndman,
Three Heresies in the Application of the Refugee Convention, 1 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 155, 171 (1989); see
also Th6odor Meron, Agora: The 1994 U.S. Action in Haiti: Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 80-81 (1995); Carlos Mauel Vizquez, The "Self-executing" Character of the
Refugee Protocol's Nonrefoulement Obligation, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 39 (1993).
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Cutting across the debates that have raged about whether or not
Australia's "protection obligations" were properly engaged, what was
perhaps most striking throughout the whole Tampa Affair was the nature of
Australia's actions in resolving the impasse that developed. Although going
to great lengths to assert absence of jurisdiction, Australia did, in fact, take
responsibility for the rescuees. Australian Special Armed Services officers
took control of the Tampa and ultimately oversaw the transfer of the
rescuees to an Australian naval vessel (the HMAS Manoora). Whatever the
criticisms that can be made of Australia in the early stages of the Tampa
Incident, it could not be said that Australia engaged in refoulement in the
sense of sending people back to places where they would face persecution.
The rescuees were taken to the Pacific island state of Nauru, to New
Zealand, and later, some were taken to PNG's Manus Island. The
involvement of the UNHCR and the IOM in the Nauruan operation ensured
that all persons claiming to be refugees would have their refugee claims
assessed. Australian officials undertook the refugee status processing of half
of the Tampa rescuees, and were solely responsible for processing most of




Furthermore, Australia bankrolled the major actors (Nauru, PNG, and
the U.N. agencies) and assumed some responsibility itself for determining
the refugee claims of the rescuees. Australia still maintains tight control
over the centers established in Nauru and PNG, even down to exercising a
veto over applications for visas for outsiders to visit those places. Australia
also appears to be exercising some control over the fate of both those
recognized as refugees and over those whose claims are rejected. 40  It is
difficult characterize Australia's behavior as other than a de facto
assumption ofjurisdiction.4 1
'9 For a detailed account of Operation Relex, see infra Part III. The operation is described in the
report prepared by Oxfam and Community Aid Abroad. See Adrift in the Pacific: The Implications of
Australia's Pacific Refugee Solution, OXFAM, Feb. 2002, at app. 1, http://www.caa.org.au/
campaigns/submissions/pacificsolution/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2003) [hereinafter Adrift in the Pacific].
'0 Interview with Ellen Hansen, External Affairs Officer, UNHCR, in Canberra, Austl. (Aug. 2002)
[hereinafter August Interview with Ellen Hansen].
41 The de facto care that was given to the asylum seekers who were apprehended underscores
assertions made by the Australian Government about the lawfulness of its actions.
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D. U.S. Precedent, the Tampa Incident, and the Divide Between
Internatinnal and DnmP.v tic Law
When Australia's Parliament met to pass legislation to ensure the
retrospective legality of the Government's actions throughout the Tampa
Incident42 some effort was made to convince Parliamentarians that Australia
was not the only country adopting a tough stance against unauthorized boat
arrivals. Briefing papers43 were produced that detailed the high seas
interdiction program run by the United States to prevent Cuban and Haitian
asylum seekers from landing on U.S. soil,44 culminating in the forced return
of many thousands of boat people to Haiti in 1995. 45
If Australia's Government modeled its actions on those of the United
States, similarities are also apparent in the manner in which the superior
Australian and U.S. courts have handled the legal crises generated by
interdiction in practice. Interesting parallels can be found between the way
Australia's Full Federal Court responded to the Tampa Incident and the U.S.
Supreme Court's treatment of the Haitian interdiction program. In both
countries, public interest advocates came forward to challenge the policies
and practices adopted and the judiciary ultimately declined to intervene. 46 In
42 See Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act, 2001 (Austl.).
" See Bills Digest No. 62 2001-02: Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Bill
2001, Dept. of the Parliamentary Library, http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2001-02/02bd062.htm
(last reviewed Aug. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Bills Digest No. 62 2001-021; see also Nathan Hancock, Current
Issues Brief5 2001-02: Refugee Law Recent Legislative Developments, Dept. of the Parliamentary Library,
Sept. 18, 2001, http://www.aph.gov.aulibrary/pubs/cib/2001-02/O2cibO5.htm (last reviewed Sept. 27,
2001).
4 Following is a selection of the many articles written on the interdiction program that has been
employed in the United States since the early 1980s: Margaret A. Coon, The Law of Interdiction: Time for
Change, 27 LA. BAR J. 223 (1980); Stanley Mailman, Reagan's Policy on Haitian Refugees, 186 N.Y. L.J.
1, col. 1 (Oct. 7, 1981); Louis B. Sohn, Interdiction of Vessels on the High Seas, 18 INT'LLAW. 411 (1984);
and Bill Frelick, Haitian Boat Interdiction and Return: First Asylum and First Principles of Refugee
Protection, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 675 (1993) [hereinafter Frelick, Haitian Boat Interdiction and Return].
45 See James R. Zink, Race and Foreign Policy in Refugee Law: A Historical Perspective of the
Haitian Refugee Crises, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 559 (1998); Frelick, Haitian Boat Interdiction and Return,
supra note 44; Bill Frelick, U.S. Refugee Policy in the Carribean: No Bridge Over Troubled Waters, 20
FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFT. 67 (1996); Hiroshi Motomura, Haitian Asylum Seekers: Interdiction and
Immigrants' Rights, 26 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 695 (1993); Thomas David Jones, A Human Rights Tragedy: The
Cuban and Haitian Refugee Crises Revisited, 9 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 479 (1995); see also Thomas David
Jones, International Decision, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 477 (Judith Hippler Bello ed., 1996); and other articles in
7 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. (1993) (symposium edition).
46 In the United States, various challenges were made to the Haitian interdiction program by the
Haitian Centers Council, culminating in the Supreme Court case of Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,
113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993). The Tampa Incident came to the Federal Court at the instigation of Eric Vadarlis,
the Victorian Council for Civil Liberties, and the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. See
Vadarlis v. Ruddock (2001) 110 F.C.R. 452, overruled by Ruddock v. Vadarlis (2001) 110 F.C.R. 491;
Vadarlis v. Ruddock, High Court Transcript, No. M93 of 2001 (Nov. 27, 2001) (review denied by the
Australian High Court).
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both cases, the failure of the court actions was predicated on two factors: the
supremacy of domestic law over international law and the "territoriality"
principle-the notion that applicable international legal norms apply only to
persons physically present in state territory.
In the United States, the action brought by the Haitian Centers
Council resulted in a ruling by the Supreme Court that the interdiction
program was legal.4 7 The Court held that the prohibition on refoulement in
U.S. law4 8 did not operate with respect to actions taken outside U.S.
territory-in this case on the high seas.49  The Court also used selected
passages from the Travaux Pr~paratoires of the Refugee Convention to
assert that the Refugee Convention only applies to persons within the
territories of States Parties. 50  As Mathew points out in her critique of this
decision, however, such a reading of the historical documents relating to the
Refugee Convention sits uneasily with basic principles governing the
interpretation of international instruments.5 1
In Australia, challenges made to the Government's actions in the
Tampa Incident also failed in spite of an initial victory before a single judge
of the Federal Court.52 The Government's refusal to allow any access to the
persons taken on board the Tampa meant that advocates in Australia were
unable to gain instructions from the rescuees for the purpose of mounting a
legal challenge under Australia's Migration Act of 1958 ("Migration Act").
The applicants were acknowledged as having standing to bring an action for
17 See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549. Again, many articles have been written
on this decision. In addition to those cited in notes 42-43, supra, see Janice D. Villiers, Closed Borders,
Closed Ports: The Plight of Haitians Seeking Asylum in the United States, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 841 (1994);
Andrew G. Pizor, Note, The Return of Haitian Refugees, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1062 (1994); and Kevin
R. Johnson, Judicial Acquiescence in the Executive Branch 's Pursuit of Foreign Policy and Domestic
Agendas in Immigration Matters: The Case of the Haitian Asylum-Seekers, 7 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 1 (1993).
48 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.A § 1231(b)(3) (West 2000 & Supp.
2002). Section 208 of this Act confers discretion on the Attorney General to grant asylum to a person who
is recognised to be a refugee. Id.; see generally KAREN MUSALO ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: A
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONALAPPROACH 1, 90-140 (Carolina Acad. Press 2d ed. 2002) (1997).
49 For the dissenting argument by Justice Blackmun, see Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2568. For further
argument by Justice Blackmun, see Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104
YALE L.J. 39 (1994), wherein the Justice attacks the majority's ruling in the context of international law.
50 See Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2565. Note that other passages from the Travaux can be cited to opposite
effect. See Hathaway, supra note 1, at 41.
51 See Mathew, Legal Issues, supra note 4, at 7. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). Article 31 of the Vienna Convention confins that
treaties should be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and Article 32 permits
recourse to secondary source material only where the primary means of treaty interpretation have absurd or
unreasonable results. Id.
" The advocates succeeded at first before Justice North in the Federal Court, who held that the
asylum seekers were being detained by the Australian authorities in circumstances where there was no basis
in Australian law for the action being taken. See Vadarlis v. Ruddock (2001) 110 F.C.R. 452, overruled by
Ruddock v. Vadarlis (2001) 110 F.C.R. 491.
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orders in the nature of habeas corpus so as to seek the release of the Tampa
rescuees, 53 but were held to have no right to mount any other kind of legal
challenge. In particular, the Full Federal Court held that the applicants had
no standing to seek a writ of mandamus to compel the Minister to act in
accordance with the law.
54
The Applicants' substantive claim was based on an argument that the
Migration Act operated to require the landing of the rescuees. Eric Vardarlis
asserted that the status of the rescuees as unlawful non-citizens meant that
they had to be taken into immigration detention within Australia pursuant to
§ 189 of the Migration Act.55 In the alternative, the Victorian Council of
Civil Liberties argued that § 245F required the Government to bring the
rescuees to the mainland of Australia, where they would then be entitled to
lodge formal claims for refugee status pursuant to § 36 of the Act.56
Vardarlis also argued that the refusal to allow him access to the rescuees
constituted a breach of his implied constitutional freedom of
53 The Federal Court, both at first instance and on appeal, acknowledged the liberty of the person is a
human right of such fundamental importance that any person has the right under the common law to
challenge the legality of another's detention. See Vadarlis, 110 F.C.R. at 469 (Black, C.J., concluding that
"there is no non-statutory Executive or prerogative authority for the detention of those rescued"). See also
Waters v. Commonwealth of Australia, (1951) 82 C.L.R. 188, 190 (stating that subject to certain
qualifications, any person may move any court of competent jurisdiction for habeas corpus with respect to
any person alleged to be unlawfully detained).
54 See Vadarlis, 110 F.C.R. at 529-30.
55 id.
56 Chief Justice Black provides the following description of the § 245F provisions in the Migration
Act 1958:
Section 245F confers on officers the power to board ships. Section 245F(1) provides:
This section applies to a ship that is outside the territorial sea of a
foreign country if:
(a) a request to board the ship has been made under section 245B;
(b) the ship is a foreign ship described in subsection 245C(3) (which
allows foreign ships on the high seas to be chased); or
(c) the ship is an Australian ship.
For the purposes of this section, "officer" is defined by § 5 but also includes any person
who is in command of the Commonwealth ship, or is a member of the crew, or is a
member of the Australian Defence Force (§ 245F(18)). He or she may not only board a
ship, but may also search and take copies of any document, and interrogate persons
aboard. Such a person may make arrests without warrant if (amongst other things) he or
she suspects that a person has committed an offence against the Act (§ 245F(3)(f)). In
doing so, such force is as is necessary and reasonable in the exercise of a power under
this section may be used (§ 245F(12) and (13)). The officer may then detain the ship and
"bring it, or cause it to be brought, to a port or other place that he or she considers
appropriate" if the officer reasonably suspects that the ship is or has been involved in a
contravention of the Act, either in or outside Australia (§ 245F(8)). Importantly for
present purposes, the officer may also detain any person who is found on the ship and
bring the person, or cause the person to be brought, to the migration zone (§ 245F(9)).
See Vadarlis, 110 F.C.R. at 506-07.
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57communication. He sought an injunction and mandamus to allow him to
give legal advice to the rescuees. 8
Even though the applicants had standing to question the detention of
the rescuees, it did not follow automatically that the writ of habeas corpus
would run. The remedy was dependent on the applicants demonstrating that
the rescuees were being detained and that their custody was unlawful. In the
Full Federal Court, the majority held against the applicants on both these
counts. Justice French, with whom Justice Beaumont agreed, relied on the
reasoning of the High Court in an earlier case involving an attempt to
challenge the lawfulness of the mandated detention of asylum seekers within
Australia.59 Somewhat counter-intuitively, he held that the rescuees were
not being "detained" at law because they were free to travel anywhere they
wished (except to Australia). 60 Both Justice North at first instance and Chief
Justice Black on appeal disagreed strongly with this characterization of
events. In a persuasive dissent, Chief Justice Black examined the manner in
which the European Court of Human Rights treated the same issue in Amuur
v. France.6 1 That case involved four Somali asylum seekers who were kept
for twenty days in the transit zone of Paris-Orly airport, and the argument
was made that the asylum seekers were not detained because they could
have left at any time by agreeing to return to Syria, from whence they had
traveled to France.62 The Court in that case said:
The mere fact that it is possible for asylum seekers to leave
voluntarily the country where they wish to take refuge cannot
exclude a restriction on liberty... Furthermore, this possibility
becomes theoretical if no other country offering protection
comparable to the protection they expect to find in the country
where they are seeking asylum is inclined or prepared to take
63them in.
Having found that the Tampa rescuees were not being detained, Justice
French also ruled that the Government's actions were not rendered unlawful
" Id. at 530.
58 id.
59 See Chu Kheng Lim v. Minister for Irnigration and Ethnic Affairs, (1992) 176 C.L.R. 1. For an
account of this case, see Mary Crock, Climbing Jacob's Ladder: The High Court and the Administrative
Detention ofAsylum Seekers in Australia, 15 SYDNEY L. REv. 338 (1993).
" Vadarlis, I10 F.C.R. at 548.
6' 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 533 (1996).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 558. See Vadarlis, 110 F.C.R. at 510.
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by the fact that there was no legislative basis for them.64 Justice French
suggested that the nature of the executivc power conferred on the
Government under the Australian Constitution was such that legislation was
not needed to render lawful any actions taken to protect Australia's
borders.
65
Amidst the flurry of legislative change on September 26, 2001, Justice
French's comments did not go unnoticed by government drafters. The
Migration Act amendments included a new § 7A, which confirms the power
of the Executive to act outside of any legislative authority. 6  The newsection reads:
The existence of a statutory power under this Act does not
prevent the exercise of any executive power of the
Commonwealth to protect Australia's borders, including, where
necessary, by ejecting persons who have crossed those
borders. 67
In referring to "persons," the Act makes no distinction between citizens and
foreigners.
In his judgment, Justice Beaumont held that the action had to fail
because there was no "relevant substantive cause of action (that is, a legal
right) recognized by law and enforceable by [the] [sic] court." He held that
the Federal Court had no inherent jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas
corpus68 and that, in any event, a writ to force release from detention could
not be used to compel the Government to admit an individual into Australian
territory. Justice Beaumont held that the executive alone had the power to
authorize such an entry.
Taken to its logical conclusion, this last aspect of Justice Beaumont's
ruling sits curiously with the long tradition of judicial review of immigration
applications in Australia. Prior to the introduction of the current regulatory
" Vadarlis, 110 F.C.R. at 543-44.
65 Id. Given Justice French's findings on the detention point, these comments probably constitute
obiter dicta.
See Migration Act 1958, § 7A (Austl.).
67 Id.
61 Justice Beaumont cited Re Officer in Charge of Cells, ACT Supreme Court, Ex parte Eastman,
where the High Court held that habeas corpus could not be used as a means of collaterally impeaching the
correctness of orders made by a court of competent jurisdiction that had not been shown to be a nullity.
Vadarlis, 110 F.C.R. at 517, citing Re Officer in Charge of Cells, ACT Supreme Court, Ex parte Eastman,
(1994) 123 A.L.R. 478. In that case, the High Court also held that the High Court's jurisdiction to entertain
this writ could only arise as an incident of an action brought within the Court's original or appellate
jurisdiction. See Re Officer in Charge of Cells, ACT Supreme Court, Ex parte Eastman, 123 A.L.R. 478, at
paras. 102-03.
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scheme in immigration, no applicant for a visa or entry permit could lay
claim to a "right" to enter the country. However, this fact did not prevent
the Australian courts from entertaining any number of challenges to visa
refusals, from persons both outside Australia and within the country. This
point was made forcefully by Chief Justice Black in his dissent, which
stated:
As in Chin Yow, so too here, the fact that the rescued people did
not have any "right" to enter Australian waters does not answer
the question whether they have been detained. Nor does it
deprive them of the ability to seek redress from this Court by
way of habeas corpus. As Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ said
in Lim at 19, citing, amongst other cases, Lo Pak and Kioa v.
West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 631 (emphasis added):
Under the common law of Australia ... an alien
who is within this country, whether lawfully or
unlawfully, is not an outlaw. Neither public
official nor private person can lawfully detain him
or her or deal with his or her property except under
and in accordance with some positive authority
conferred by the law (emphasis added).
See also per McHugh J at 63.
The House of Lords similarly held that illegal entrants were
entitled to seek redress by means of habeas corpus in R v. Home
Secretary; Ex parte Khawaja [1984] AC 74, with Lord
Scarman stating (at 111) that:
There is no distinction between British nationals
and others. He who is subject to English law is
entitled to its protection. This principle has been
in the law at least since Lord Mansfield freed "the
black" in Sommersett [(1772) 20 How St Tr 2]...
It is, therefore, important to focus not on the lack of any right of
the rescued people to enter Australia, but on whether the
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rescued people were, in a real and practical sense, detained by
the Commonwealth.69
Leaving aside questions about the correctness of his reasoning, Justice
Beaumont's judgment in the Tampa case is interesting in the wider context
of the incident. The judgment is replete with a sense of urgency, if not
moral panic. The judge underscores passages and words. His conclusion-
that an alien has no right to enter Australia-is placed quite literally in bold
print. The effect is to emphasize and re-emphasize the outsider status of the
rescuees. The word "alien" appears no less than twenty-seven times in the
thirty paragraphs of his judgment.
None of the judges in the appeal court mentions the tumultuous events
that occurred in the United States on September 11 th, the day Justice North
handed down his ruling. As the world came to learn about Osama Bin
Laden, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban in Afghanistan, it was no time at all before
Australia's politicians were warning a frightened public that the Afghan and
Middle Eastern boat people "could be terrorists., 70 One is left to wonder
whether Justice Beaumont would have been quite as vehement absent the
events of September 11 th.
The tonal change between the primary judgment and the appeal
rulings could not be more marked. Of the four Federal Court judges, Justice
North at first instance is the only one to spend much time describing the
rescuees, identifying them as fugitives from Afghanistan who "it is probable
. . . are people genuinely fearing persecution." 71 Dissenting in the Full
Court, Chief Justice Black agreed with the substance of Justice North's
rulings. However, his carefully reasoned judgment sticks closely to legal
principle, assiduously avoiding any emotive descriptions of the people
behind the action.72 Justice Beaumont's postscript does acknowledge the
potential that the rescuees could be refugees, but his addendum underscores
(again, quite literally), the international nature of the legal obligation not to
refoule refugees. Justice Beaumont draws attention to the fact that what
became known as the "Pacific Solution" did not involve the refoulement of
69 Vadarlis, 110 F.C.R. at 511. The reference to Chin Yow's case is to Chin Yow v. United States,
208 U.S. 8 (1908).
70 See, for example, comments attributed to the former Minister for Defence as reported in Robert
Manne, Australia's New Course, AGE (Nov. 12, 2002).
71 Vadarlis v. Ruddock (2001) 110 F.C.R. 452, 471, overruled by Ruddock v. Vadarlis (2001) 110
F.C.R. 491.
72 Vadarlis, 110 F.C.R. 491.
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the rescuees: they would simply all have their asylum claims assessed
outside of Australia.73
The emphasis on Australia's domestic immigration laws in the Tampa
litigation in the Federal Court74 highlights the relative disregard for
international law in Australia's reactions throughout the incident. Australia
adheres to a dualist approach to international law. Accordingly, obligations
assumed by the Executive upon signature and ratification of an international
instrument do not become binding at a domestic level unless translated
through Parliament into legislation. 75 Australia has chosen not to enact the
terms of the Refugee Convention and has no Bill of Rights or other
overriding standard operating to protect human rights. Unlike Britain and
the countries of the European Union, there is no forum outside of the
country to which an appeal might be made invoking principles of
international law.
In the U.S. litigation concerning the return of fugitives from Haiti, the
Supreme Court did at least examine to the issue of refugee status and to the
principle of non-refoulement. In ruling, however, the Supreme Court was at
least as inward looking as Australia's Full Federal Court. The victims of the
U.S. Government's actions in returning the Haitians to Haiti were even more
devoid of remedy than the Tampa rescuees. At least in the case of the
Tampa rescuees, the end result was deflection to third countries, where the
individuals involved have been permitted to lodge refugee claims. At the
height of the Haitian exodus, even the cursory attempts by the United States
Coast Guard to scrutinize boat people for possible refugee claims were
abandoned. To the extent that any of the thousands of fugitives were
political refugees, the U.S action amounted to refoulement within the
meaning of Article 33 of the Refugee Convention.76
The absence of adequate accountability mechanisms at law emerges
just as forcefully in the second stage of the Tampa Affair. There are aspects
of the so-called "Operation Relex" that are ripe for criticism-not least in
7 Id. at 521.
74 Note that an application was made for leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia. However,
leave was denied on the basis that the dispersal of the rescuees between Nauru and New Zealand had
removed the parties from the care and control of the Australian Government, thus rendering moot any
orders that might be made by the Court. See Vadarlis v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural
Affairs, High Court Transcript, No. M93 of 2001 (Nov. 27, 2001) (review denied by the Australian High
Court).
75 See, e.g., Dietrich v. The Queen, (1992) 177 C.L.R. 292, 305; R. Higgins, The Role of National
Courts in the International Legal Process, in PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE
USE IT 205 (1994); and SENATE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENCES COMMITTEE, TRICK OR
TREATY? COMMONWEALTH POWER TO MAKE AND IMPLEMENT TREATIES 86 (1995).
76 See Harold Hongju Koh, The Haitian Centers Council Case: Reflections on Refoulement and
Haitian Centers Council, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1994).
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the apparent disregard for basic human rights standards. However, from the
perspective of refugee law, once again it is difficult to assert categorically
that the initiatives taken were and are in breach of international law.
III. AFTER TAMPA: LEGISLATIVE CHANGE AND OPERATION RELEX
The Tampa Affair was the impetus for a rash of legislative
amendments to the Migration Act. Although the first Border Protection Bill
was defeated in Parliament,7 the Labor Party ultimately combined with the
Government to pass no less than seven Acts.71 The Border Protection
(Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act of 2001 retrospectively validated
all actions taken by the Commonwealth in relation to the Tampa, a second
intercepted vessel named the Aceng, and other ships stopped between
August 27, 2001 and the date of Royal Assent to the Act. By preventing the
commencement or continuance of any civil or criminal proceedings
challenging actions covered by the legislation, this legislation stifled appeals
from the Federal Court. The Act also conferred extraordinary powers on
"officers" to search, detain, and move persons aboard ships that had been
pursued, boarded, and detained by Australian authorities. Unlike the earlier
Bill, there is no requirement that officers boarding a ship act in good faith.
Moreover, the legislation is not limited to actions taken within Australia's
territorial sea, nor is any deference given to the constraints on extra-
territorial operations imposed by the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS",).79
To prevent the use of Christmas Island and nearby reefs as delivery
points for asylum seekers traveling from Indonesia,80 the Australian
'7 See Bills Digest No. 62 2001-02, supra note 43; Hancock, supra note 43.
78 See Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act, 2001 (Austl.); Migration
Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act, 2001 (Austl.); Migration
Legislation Amendment Act, No. 1, 2001 (Austl.); Migration Legislation Amendment Act, No. 3, 2001
(Austl.); Migration Legislation Amendment Act, No. 5, 2001 (Austl.); Migration Legislation Amendment
Act, No. 6, 2001; and Migration (Judicial Review) Act, 2001 (Austl.). These measures were opposed only
by the minor parties of the Australian Democrats, the Greens and independent Senator Brian Harradine.
See Australian Parliamentary Debates, DAILY HANSARD, Senate, at 27689 (Sept. 24, 2001); Australian
Parliamentary Debates, DAILY HANSARD, Senate, at 27814 (Sept. 25, 2001); Australian Parliamentary
Debates, DAILY HANSARD, Senate, at 27908-946 (Sept. 26, 2001).
79 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/122 (1982), 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 and 6 ERAsTUs C. BENEDICT,
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, Doc. No. 10-6, (Frank L. Wiswall ed., 7th rev. ed. 2001). See generally
O'CONNELL, supra note 17.
go Australia has experienced the arrival of boats carrying asylum seekers on a number of occasions
over the last thirty years. See Andreas Schloenhardt, Australia and the Boat People: 25 years of
Unauthorised Arrivals, 23 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 33 (2000). While earlier episodes saw boats arriving
from Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Peoples' Republic of China, in the late 1990s people smugglers
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Parliament empowered the Prime Minister to declare parts of Australia's
territory to be outside the "migration zone." Under the Migration
Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act of 2001, people coming
ashore at Ashmore Reef, the Keeling or Cocos Islands, or Christmas Island
are now deemed not to have entered Australia's migration zone. This
legislation introduced the concepts of "excised offshore places" and
"offshore entry persons" and operates to prevent people arriving on these
territories from accessing Australia's refugee protection regime. Other
amendments to the Migration Act reinforced the Government's policy of
zero tolerance for refugees who "asylum shop., 81  The asylum seekers
making their way to Australia via Indonesia, it is argued, are individuals
who have secured safety from persecution in a third country, but who come
to Australia using the services of people smugglers so as to achieve an
"immigration outcome." 82  As well as extending the reach of "safe third
country" provisions to limit protection for asylum seekers in Australia,83 this
Act limits the ability of refugees anywhere to access Australian protection if
they could find "effective protection" in another country. 84 The legislative
changes increased the powers of the executive at the expense of the
judiciary,85  raised the bar for refugee claimants in Australia,86  and
operating through Indonesia made that country an important point of transit for asylum seekers wishing to
come to Australia. Id. The other major change in the pattern of arrivals in recent years relates to the
countries of origin of the asylum seekers. Id. The most recent arrivals have been nationals of Iraq, Iran,
and Afghanistan, with a sprinkling from other refugee producing countries. Id.
I DIMIA describes the most recent cohort of asylum seekers who transit through Indonesia on their
way to Australia as individuals who have obtained or who could obtain protection from persecution, but
who seek to come to Australia to achieve "an immigration outcome." See, e.g., People Smuggling
Background Paper, supra note 8. The Minister's view is that U.N. processes are undermined if refugees
are allowed to take matters into their own hands by seeking out countries where they will receive most
favorable treatment and outcomes. Id. Such people are said to be jumping the "queue" of persons
recognized by the U.N. as refugees and ear-marked for resettlement in third countries. Id. This
characterization of the refugees is underscored by the Australian Government by removing one place in
Australia's overseas "humanitarian" intake for every asylum seeker recognized as a refugee within
Australia. Id.
82 Id.
8' The previous safe third country provisions are contained in the Migration Act 1958, §§ 91A-91H
(Austl.). See Schloenhardt, supra note 80, at 50-51; and Savitri Taylor, Australia's "Safe Third Country"
Provisions: Their Impact on Australia's Fulfillment of its Non-Refoulement Obligations, 15 U. TASMANIA
L. REv. 196 (1996). These provisions were extended by the Migration Amendment (Excision from
Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act, 2001 (Austl.).
84 The amendments provide that Australia is "taken not to have protection obligations" to any non-
citizen who "has not taken all possible steps to avail himself or herself of a right to enter and reside in,
whether temporarily or permanently and however that right arose or is expressed, any country apart from
Australia, including countries of which the non-citizen is a national." See Migration Act 1958, § 36(3)
(Austl.).
s These changes are set out in the amended Part 8 of the Migration Act 1958, and purport to:
remove the right to judicial review of all migration and refugee decisions in all but exceptional
circumstances; ban class or representative actions in migration cases; and impose mandatory, non-
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introduced mandatory prison terms of eight to ten years for persons
convicted of people smuggling. 87
Some commentators assert that the new laws are in breach of
Australia's international legal obligations because they authorize Australian
"officers" to operate outside of Australia's territorial jurisdiction.88  The
legislation certainly goes beyond what has been proposed by the United
Nations to combat people smuggling. The Draft Protocol against the
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea (supplementing the Draft
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime) encourages states to
exercise their jurisdiction fully to combat people smuggling.89 However, it
does not advise states to exceed their jurisdiction. Nor are there any moves
to expand the maritime jurisdiction of states under international law.
If Australia can claim, with some justification, that it has not refouled
the Tampa (and Aceng) refugees, the same cannot be said of all of its actions
following the Tampa Affair. The passage of the legislation in September
2001 coincided with the institution of a full-scale interdiction and disruption
program involving various Australian authorities9° and Indonesian officials.
extendable time limits on applications to the High Court. See Simon Evans, Protection Visas and Privative
Clause Decisions. Hickman and the Migration Act 1958, 9 AuSL. J. ADMIN. L. 49 (2002) (discussing
changes to the Migration Act 1958).
6 The amendments:
1) expanded the range of temporary visas granted to persons recognised as refugees,
with visas allowing for stays of between 3 and 5 years;
2) barred access to protection to any person convicted of "detention related offences"
such as escaping from detention or rioting; and
3) tightened refugee processing provisions and redefined the definition of refugee for
the purposes of Australian law - in particular, it:
a) provided that families cannot comprise a particular social group-that
each family member must meet the definition of refugee on their own
account (unless included on the one application); and
b) introduced new provisions allowing evidence provided by asylum
seekers at initial interviews to be taken down and used against them
should they later change their story.
See Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act, 2001 (Austl.);
and Migration Legislation Amendment Act, No. 6, 2001 (Austl.).
87 See Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act, 2001, sched. 2 (Austl.).
8s See generally Hancock, supra note 43. See Ivan Shearer, Public International Law: An Australian
Perspective, in SAM BLAY ET AL., PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE 162-64
(1997) (discussing the extent and nature of Australia's powers at sea).
9 Draft Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea, May 13, 1999,
A/AC.254/4/Add.l/Rev.1. See Andreas Schloenhardt, Trafficking in Migrants: Illegal Migration and
Organized Crime in Australia and the Asia Pacific Region, 29 INT'LJ. SOC. L. 331 (2001).
'0 The Australian National Audit Office lists the following agencies as being involved in a four-part
strategy to reduce unauthorized migration to Australia: Department of Immigration and Multicultural and
Indigenous Affairs ("DIMIA"), Australian Customs Service, the Australian Federal Police, the Australian
Quarantine and Inspection Service, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Coastwatch, the
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The program brought an abrupt halt to the arrival in Australian territory of
boats from Indonesia, carrying asylum seekers without visas. 91  The
Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and
Indigenous Affairs reported in 2002:
An active program of bilateral engagement was
undertaken, designed to bring about the return of unauthorized
arrivals to their country of origin or to a country where they
previously enjoyed effective protection. Return to a country of
nationality and readmission of Third Country nationals to a
country of first asylum are strong deterrents to unauthorized
movement as they deny those travelling illegally the migration
outcome they sought.
There was a positive level of cooperation with Indonesia.
Over 1,200 illegal migrants, many of them potential
unauthorized arrivals in Australia, were intercepted and
detained in Indonesia. The department supported Indonesia in
engaging the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) to
manage the groups detained and return some members who
volunteered to return home. The Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) undertook the role
of assessing the claims of those who sought asylum and finding
durable solutions for those found to need protection.
92
Department of Defence, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the Attorney General's
Department. See AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE, AUDIT REPORT NO. 57 2001-02: MANAGEMENT
FRAMEWORK FOR PREVENTING UNLAWFUL ENTRY INTO AUSTRALIAN TERRITORY 30 (2002),
http://www.anao.gov.au/WebSite.nsf/Publications/4A256AE90015F69BCA256BD600802CBE/$file/Audit
+Report+57.pdf [hereinafter ANAO]. It may be inferred that Australia's security and intelligence agencies
are also involved. Id. The four-part strategy has the following elements:
" prevention of the problem by minimising outflows from countries of origin and
secondary outflows from countries of origin;
" working with other countries to disrupt people smugglers and intercept their
clients en-route to Australia;
• minimising incentives to travel illegally to Australia; and
" international cooperation aimed at strengthening the international system of
protection and disrupting people smuggling and refugee forum shopping.
Id.
91 No boat carrying asylum seekers has made it to Australian territory since August 22, 2001. See
Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Fact Sheet 74a: Boat Arrival
Details, http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/74a boatarrivals.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2003) [hereinafter Fact
Sheet 74a].
92 See Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Annual Report 2000-01,
http://www.imrni.gov.au/annual-reportlannrepOl/report4.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2003). See also Minister
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Th.e Anniual Report does not detail in full the "disruption" operations in
which the Australian authorities engaged to prevent the departure of what
the Australian authorities describe as "secondary flow" or "secondary
movement" asylum seekers. 93  Although the Australian National Audit
Office ("ANAO") Report provides more information-including an
interesting flow chart94 -not much is known about the practical application
of the laws and policy adopted following the Tampa Incident in what was
code-named "Operation Relex." However, accounts have emerged of
Australia interdicting vessels carrying asylum seekers outside of its
territorial waters as well as in the immediate proximity of its newly
"excised" territories, and of those vessels being towed or escorted back to
Indonesia.9 5
As boats continued to arrive, the Australian authorities operating on
the high seas off Indonesia simply refused to allow boats past into Australian
waters. The intercepted vessels-referred to as "Suspected Illegal Entry
Vessels" or SIEVs-included the now infamous SIEV 4. In early October
2001, the media carried accounts of asylum seekers on this vessel, wearing
life jackets, jumping and throwing their children overboard in the hope that
the Australians would rescue them. Later reports suggested that the boat had
been fired upon by Australian naval authorities prior to the boat being
96boarded by the Australians. Still later reports and a video emerged
suggesting that the whole story was false. After the federal election in
November 2001 returned the Howard Government to power, the Opposition
and minor parties in the Senate instituted a broad ranging inquiry into the
affair. The Senate Select Committee reported in 2002 that the Government
had misused photographs of the sinking SIEV 4 to its political advantage,
promoting the impression that the rescued asylum seekers were manipulative
and abusive.97
for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Background Paper on Unauthorised Arrivals
Strategy: Minister's International Engagements,
http://www.ninister.immi.gov.au/media-releases/media0 l/rO 113 _engagements.htm (last updated July 22,
2002).
93 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
94 See ANAO, supra note 90, fig. 1.4, at 33 (Conceptual Map of Detection and Prevention
Measures).
95 See, e.g., To Deter and To Deny (ABC Four Comers, ABC television broadcast, Mar. 2002); By
Invitation Only, supra note 7.
96 See John Ferguson, Navy Photos Show Children Overboard; Water Torture, HERALD SUN
(Melbourne), Oct. 11, 2001, at 3. Reports indicate that the boat was fired on no less than four times before
the Australians boarded it. Id.
97 See Majority Report: A Certain Maritime Incident Before the Senate Select Committee, at ch. 6,
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/conumittee/maritimeincident-Ctte/maritime/report/contents.htm
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The Senate inquiry into the "children overboard" affair and the work
of investigative journalists 98 brought out evidence of Australian involvement
in incidents at sea resulting in two confirmed deaths and three suspected
deaths by drowning. Overshadowing these incidents was the sinking in
October 2001 of SIEV X, a boat crammed with mainly Afghan and Iraqi
asylum seekers embarking from Indonesia. Over 350 lives were lost-
making the incident the worst peacetime maritime disaster in Australia's
region. Allegations have emerged of Indonesian officials forcing asylum
seekers onto the doomed and overloaded vessel at gunpoint, and of
Australian surveillance operations being aware that the vessel had left, but
doing nothing to track its passage or to come to the assistance of the asylum
seekers in a timely fashion.
99
The Government strongly disputes suggestions that Australia is in any
way accountable for these events, arguing that such tragic occurrences
simply underscore the hazards of using people smugglers in an attempt to
circumvent regular immigration procedures. While defenses may be found
to each dreadful incident, the plain truth is that without Australia's harsh
policies and attitudes, the probabilities are that these lives would not have
been lost.
The Government's interpretation various episodes involving the
interception of boats headed for Australia in late 2001 was one of the more
controversial-and shameful-aspects of Australian politics leading up to
the federal election on November 10, 2001. There can be few doubts that
the Government fanned concerns about the boat people both through the
rhetoric of its Ministers and by allowing the dissemination of false or
misleading information.
100
Of equal concern are reports that the Australian Federal Police
("AFP") engaged in clandestine "disruption" activities in Indonesia to stop
asylum seekers from making their way to Australia. One investigative
journalist elicited assertions by an AFP "operative" that he had taken money
from would-be boat people for proposed voyages to Australia, splitting the
proceeds with Indonesian officials who acted to ensure that the boats in
(last reviewed Oct. 23, 2002) (investigatory report).
98 Id.
9' See Margo Kingston, SIEV-X.- Another Bombshell, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 20, 2002,
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/09/20/1032054962047.htmrl. See also Andrew Clenell, Failure to
Act on Smuggler Blamed for 350 Boat Deaths, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Feb. 25, 2002,
http://old.smh.com.au/news/0202/25/national/national3.html.
1oo See PATRICK WELLER, DON'T TELL THE PRIME MINISTER (2002). The culture of self-harm that
developed within the inmuigration detention centers within Australia was used as further evidence of "un-
Australian" behavior. Id.
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question never reached their destination.1° 1 While there is no evidence of a
link between this individual and those responsible for sinking the SIEV X,
the AFP has confirmed that the individual named was employed by them
and that he was authorized to engage in disruption activities.,
°2
Although the Government vehemently disputes this view, Operation
Relex breaches the non-refoulement obligation in the Refugee Convention,
as well as more general international legal obligations. Indonesia is not a
State Party to the Refugee Convention. It is true that asylum seekers
brought to Indonesia during the late 1990s by people smugglers were
tolerated by the Indonesian Government. Furthermore, through agreements
brokered by the Australian Government, the Indonesian government did
agree to let the UNHCR and the IOM establish refugee status determination
centers across Indonesia.10 3 However, the SIEV X incident provides a basis
for doubting whether the protection offered to Muslim asylum seekers in that
country is "effective" in the sense of providing some form of tenure or
sanctuary. The obligation not to refoule refugees to a place where they face
persecution extends to indirect as well as direct return. °4
Hathaway has argued that Australia's deflection of the Tampa asylum
seekers, and of subsequent boat people, in the course of Operation Relex
constituted behavior that penalized the asylum seekers involved because of
'o1 See Kevin John Enniss: The AFP Cover Up (Sunday Program, SIEV X television broadcast, Aug.
27, 2003), http://www.sievx.com/archives/2002_08-09/20020827.shtml (transcript of program) [hereinafter
The AFP Cover Up).
102 Id.
103 DIMIA provides the following account of these arrangements:
Australia has supported the establishment of cooperative arrangements between the
UNHCR and the IOM and the Governments of Indonesia and Cambodia to intercept
irregular migrants within their territories. The arrangements have resulted in:
" the interception of over 2,700 irregular migrants. Of that number
approximately 990 are still in detention across Indonesia (mainly Iraqi
and Afghan nationals). This number comprises people awaiting
refugee determination as well as those who have been found not to be
in need of protection;
" the UNHCR assessing 480 third country nationals to be refugees. The
UNHCR is currently negotiating with donor countries for the
resettlement of these people; and
" the removal by IOM of 180 third country nationals from Indonesia.
Detainees are accommodated in a number of transmigration centres or hotels across the
Indonesian archipelago, which are not secure and a number have therefore left these
arrangements.
See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Background Paper on
Unauthorised Arrivals Strategy,
http://www.minister.innri.gov.au/media_releases/media01/r0 113 _bgpaper.htm (last updated July 22,
2002).
104 See Mathew, Australian Refugee Protection, supra note 4, at 672.
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the alleged illegal mode of their entry. Article 31(1) of the Refugee
Convention specifically prohibits States Parties from engaging in this kind
of behavior-that is, imposing penalties on refugees on account of their
illegal entry.
Australia's treatment of both the Pacific Solution asylum seekers and
those processed on-shore10 5 is arguably punitive in nature. Australia argues,
however, that whether it is technically in breach of Article 31 is a moot
point. On its face, Article 31 (1) applies to frontline refugee-receiving States.
The refugees to whom the no-penalty provisions apply are those "coming
directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the
sense of Article 1." The Australian Government argues that the boat people
intercepted en route to Australia do not meet this description. Indeed, as
noted earlier, the official Australian line is that the arrivals represent
"secondary refugee flows." Furthermore, Article 31(1), on its face, also
seems to apply to refugees within a State's territory. Its application to
refugees outside the country is less clear-cut.
Arguments about the legality of Operation Relex are not limited to
fine interpretations of Article 31 of the Refugee Convention. Where the
interdiction operation has lead to death, injury, and the inordinate suffering
of asylum seekers, Australia's actions arguably place it in breach not only of
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, but also of a range of international
human rights instruments. These include the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), 10 6 the Convention against Torture and
All Forms of Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment ("Torture
Convention"),10 7 and-given the high number of children amongst the
asylum seekers intercepted-the Convention on the Rights of the Child.108
The material uncovered by U.S.-based Human Rights Watch in interviewing
:o5 See infra Part IV.
06 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S.
171, Dec. 16, 1966 [hereinafter ICCPR]. Article 6 of that instrument enshrines the right to life, and Article
7 enshrines the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Id.
Article 10(1) of the ICCPR requires that "[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person." Id.
107 See Convention Against Torture and All Forms of Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment, G.A.
Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 39th Sess., 93d mtg. at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
(1984). See, in particular, the non-refoulement obligation in Article 3. Id.
'08 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 44th Sess., 61st mtg. at 166,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989). Note that Article 22 of this instrument makes no distinction between
children asylum seekers and children who have been determined formally to meet the U.N. definition of
refugee. Id. art. 22. For an account of the rights enshrined in this instrument relevant to asylum seeker
children, see Mary Crock, You Have to be Stronger than Razor Wire. Legal Issues Relating to the
Detention of Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 10 AUsTh. J. ADMIN. L. 33, 37-38 (2002) [hereinafter Crock,
Stronger than Razor Wire].
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asylum seekers caught up in Operation Relex reinforces the view that the
operation involved Australian behavior that violated hese - international legal
instruments. 0 9
While the official Australian accounts interpret narrowly and
selectively the "hard" principles of refugee law such as the non-refoulement
and no-penalization obligations, little attention has been paid to the manner
in which the official U.N. agencies would like states to interpret the relevant
international instruments. These agencies have developed a variety of
authoritative standards reflecting the U.N.'s preferred interpretation of the
international instruments. For the Refugee Convention, there are the
conclusions of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR, 110 a body made up
of representatives of States Parties to the Refugee Convention. The ICCPR
has its own complaints and guidelines arrangements."' To the extent that
the principles enunciated by these bodies do not reflect international treaty
obligations or customary international law, they do not have the status of
binding law. At best, the various guidelines and statements of principle are
"soft" law, policy, or indicia of the way the various U.N. authorities would
like states to act or to interpret relevant international laws. To complicate
matters further, the unofficial standing of the various policies can also vary
according to the status of the issuing body and the extent to which the U.N.
General Assembly has given its imprimatur to the outcome of a particular
process. 112
In spite of the tendency of the Australian Government to dismiss as
irrelevant this body of "soft" international law, it is worth noting that bodies
such as the Executive Committee of the UNHCR have consistently exhorted
States Parties to the Refugee Convention not to behave as Australia did in
late 2001. The Background Note on the Protection of Asylum Seekers and
Refugees Rescued at Sea-prepared by the UNHCR in March 2002-
includes an Annex setting out no less than seventeen resolutions by its
109 See By Invitation Only, supra note 7.
110 For a collection of the conclusions relevant to this issue, see GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, ARTICLE 31
OF THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES: NON-PENALIZATION, DETENTION AND
PROTECTION, 61 (UNHCR Global Consultations 2001), http://www.unhcr.ch (last visited Jan. 19, 2003)
(prepared at the request of the Department of International Protection for the UNHCR Global
Consultations).
1 Pursuant to an optional Protocol, the Human Rights Committee is empowered to make rulings on
complaints made by individuals alleging a breach of the ICCPR. See Hilary Charlesworth, Australia's
Accession to the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 18
MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 428 (1991). This Committee has also produced both general comments and rules
on specific clauses of the ICCPR. Id.
112 Note, for example, that while the UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 23, was placed before the U.N.
General Assembly for approval, the various guidelines produced by the UNHCR in and after 1999 have not
yet been through this process.
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Executive Committee over the years.1 13  All express the concern of the
Committee about the tendency of States Parties to close their frontiers to,
and otherwise to fail to respond to the needs of distressed refugees and
asylum seekers traveling by boat. 1
4
The fine arguments made by the Australian Government to justify
Operation Relex in the name of national sovereignty and border control have
little to commend them from a moral standpoint. In late 2001, the vast
majority of fugitives from Iraq and Afghanistan clearly met the international
legal definition of refugee as most of them had fled persecution by Saddam
Hussein in Iraq or the Taliban in Afghanistan. 1 5  Indeed, uncomfortable
parallels can be found between Australia's behavior in repelling these boat
people and the actions of many Western countries in refouling Jewish
refugees before World War II. 116 However, in the harsh world of politics,
and in a climate of fear generated by the uncertainties of globalized terrorist
campaigns, it would appear that a majority of Australians strongly supported
and, at time of writing, still support the Government's policies. There also
appears to be very little public concern about the methods employed by the
Government to achieve its objectives, even when those methods may have
involved breaches of Australian criminal law.'
1 7
IV. ISLAND REFUGE OR CAST AWAY? THE "PACIFIC SOLUTION"
A. The Pacific Solution as Commodified Burden Sharing: Resonance in
U.S. Theory and Practice
The immediate sequel to the Tampa Incident was a negotiated
settlement in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding between
Australia, the UNHCR, the IOM, and a range of Pacific island countries that
saw the majority of the asylum seekers from the Tampa and the Aceng
delivered to Nauru. New Zealand agreed to take 131 asylum seekers,
13 See UNHCR, BACKGROUND NOTE ON THE PROTECTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES AT
SEA (2002), http://heiwww.unige.ch/conf/psio_230502/files/unhcr.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2003) (content
as discussed at the expert roundtable Rescue-at-Sea: Specific Aspects Relating to the Protection ofAsylum-
Seekers and Refugees, held in Lisbon, Portugal on Mar. 25-36, 2002).
114 Id.; see also Problems Related to the Rescue of Asylum-Seekers in Distress at Sea, UNHCR Dept.
of Int'l Protection, EC/SCP/30, available at www.unhcr.ch (last visited Nov. 22, 2002); and Mathew, Legal
Issues, supra note 4, at 17-18.
15 Within Australia's on-shore refugee determination system, an overwhelming majority of asylum
seekers from these countries had their claims accepted between 1999 and 2001. See August Interview with
Ellen Hansen, supra note 40. Almost all of the Iraqi (97%) and Afghan (92%) arrivals in the year ending
June 30, 1999 were recognized as refugees and allowed to remain in Australia. Id.
116 See IRVING ABELLA & HAROLD TROPER, NONE IS TOO MANY (1982).
117 See The AFP Cover Up, supra note 101.
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consisting of family groups, from the Tampa. Initially housed at the
Mangere detention facility, these asylum seekers were given frll access to
New Zealand's refugee determination system and had their asylum claims
determined within weeks.1 8 By January 2002, all but one had been accepted
as refugees and granted permanent residence in New Zealand.' 19
The UNHCR agreed to process half of the refugee claims of the
Tampa and Aceng asylum seekers on Nauru, while Australia undertook the
processing of the balance of the cases. With the interception of other boats,
and the transfer of asylum seekers from Christmas Island, arrangements
were made with PNG to establish a detention center and processing facilities
on Manus Island. 120 Australia has had sole responsibility for determining the
refugee claims of asylum seekers at this facility. By September 2002, New
Zealand had agreed to resettle a further 182 boat people from the centers at
Nauru and Manus Island found to be refugees.
121
While some of the Tampa rescuees achieved a happy outcome at the
end of 2002, the same was not true for many of the asylum seekers sent to
Nauru and Manus Island. The secrecy of the processing centers in these
places makes it difficult to ascertain with accuracy what has occurred.
However, from the information available, aspects of the arrangements raise
legal and humanitarian concerns and questions about the political wisdom of
the policies underlying the program.
The problems with the Pacific Solution are also noteworthy to the
extent that the arrangements reflect proposals that have been made in the
past by one leading U.S. academic as a more general solution to the global
refugee "problem." Refining and extending calls by James Hathaway and
others 122 to find mechanisms to force states to share the refugee burden more
equitably, Professor Peter Schuck123 has argued for the introduction of a
quota system whereby non-refugee producing states would be allocated a
certain number of refugees for care or resettlement each year. This quota
would be determined after establishing a global figure of the number of
See Adrift in the Pacific, supra note 39.
115 Interview with Ellen Hansen, External Affairs Officer, UNHCR, in Canberra, Austl. (July 2002)
[hereinafter July Interview with Ellen Hansen].
120 See Papua New Guinea Asylum Deal Done with 30 Minutes to Spare, FIN. TIMES LTD., May 28,
2002, http://www.unhcr.ch (last visited Jan. 19, 2003).
1 21 See Another 16 Refugees from Nauru Arrive in Australia, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 4, 2002,
www.unhcr.ch (last visited Jan. 19, 2003).
122 See James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making International Refugee Law Relevant
Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 115 (1997).
123 See Peter Schuck, Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 243 (1997)
[hereinafter Schuck, Refugee Burden-Sharing]. See also PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS AND IN-
BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 282-325 (1998).
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refugees in need of protection each year, and would be allocated in a manner
proportionate to the wealth and carrying capacity of a nation. The essence
of Schuck's proposal is that developed states124 should then be able to elect
either to take in their allocation of refugees or pay other states to take in or
care for the specified number. Put another way, Shuck proposes that a state
should be able to subrogate its liability by approaching other states to accept
its refugee quota in exchange for cash, and/or other incentives such as
"credit, commodities, development assistance, technical advice, weapons
and political support."
' 125
Schuck argues that this approach would allow for a more principled
and controlled handling of the refugee problem. He points out that the
current refugee protection system depends more on the political landscape of
the receiving state than on the terms of the Refugee Convention. 26  He
posits that refugees are only taken in and accepted by states when the social,
economic, and political climate is favorable and after national security and
foreign policy interests are taken into consideration. Schuck's vision is that
the UNHCR would become the central coordinating body for the care and
distribution of refugees, but that it should be given a secure funding base so
as to make the agency less susceptible to political and fiscal pressures from
States Parties to the Refugee Convention.
127
To the extent that Australia is bankrolling the Pacific Solution, it
could be argued that the arrangements are an example of Australia "buying
out" its protection obligations for refugees in its region. Neither Nauru nor
PNG are actively involved in assessing the refugee claims of the asylum
seekers in question. However, these two countries have provided the
physical amenities necessary for the operation. The assistance has been
given in exchange for monetary compensation. In the case of Nauru,
Australia paid more than AUD 30 million, a figure that is greater than all of
124 Schuck, Refugee Burden-Sharing, supra note 123, at 281. Countries excluded from the allocation
scheme would be those ascertained to be too poor, and states "that engage in systematic violations of
human rights." Id.
12 Id. at 284. Note the non-proliferation provisos made with regard to the trade of refugees for
weapons. Id.
'2 Id. at 252.
1Z7 On the role of the UNHCR, see Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, G.A. Res. 428(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 46, U.N. Doe. A/1775 (1950). At
present, the UNHCR is funded through the contribution of member states rather than directly through the
U.N. General Assembly. Id. This arrangement creates major problems for the agency when States Parties
try to use their fiscal power to influence UNHCR policy. See Schuck, Refugee Burden-Sharing, supra note
123, at 253. For statistical data and an explanation of the UNHCR's financial requirements, see UNHCR,
Revised UNHCR Financial Requirements for 2002, Nov. 6, 2002, http://www.unhcr.cb/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdftbl=PARTNERS&id=3cd164764&page=partners (last visited Jan. 19,
2003).
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the aid provided to Nauru between 1993 and 2001.28 PNG also received
generous aid for its assistance. 129 It is also worth noting that Pacific Island
nations that were approached by the Australian Government, but declined
involvement in the program, were excluded from Australia's foreign aid
program in 2001.30 Put another way, the monetary rewards paid to Nauru
and PNG could be seen as a way of commodifying the asylum seekers in
question in a manner reminiscent of Schuck's proposal-although some
critics of the scheme have used more derogatory terms to describe the
commercial exchange. 
131
While it is difficult to imagine the United States "excising" parts of its
offshore territories as Australia has done, as noted earlier, there are many
aspects of the Pacific Solution that find resonance in U.S. policy and
practice (as well as academic theory).132 For example, the United States has
established detention centers and holding camps in some of its "trust"
territories and protectorates. An intrinsic part of the Haitian interdiction
program was the establishment of offshore processing centers for
determining whether boat people had colorable claims for refugee status.
128 See Adrift in the Pacific, supra note 39, at 13; and infra note 151. Note that Nauru is a f6rmer
Australian protectorate, which gained its independence after being effectively stripped of the natural
resources through a prolonged operation to mine the tiny island for phosphate. See Adrift in the Pacific,
supra note 39. The island has remained reliant on Australia because of its inability to restore the mined
land for agricultural or other purposes. Id.
129 See Kalinga Seneviratne, Rights: Australia Set to Back Down on Refugee Policy, INTER PRESS
SERV., Dec. 12, 2001, at 1 - 2, available at
www.oneworld.net/cgibin/indexcgi?root-l 29&url=htp%3A%2F%2Fwww/o2Eoneworld%2Eorg2Fips2%
2Fdec01%2F07%5F55%5F008%2EhtrnI (last visited Apr. 23, 2002); see also James Ridgeway, Shame
Down Under, MONDO WASH., Feb. 13-19, 2002, http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0207/ridgeway.php.
130 States that declined offers from Australia included Palau, Tuvalu, Fiji and East Timor. See Adrift
in the Pacific, supra note 39.
131 See Adrift in the Pacific, supra note 39, at app. 2. The report quotes an Independent member of
Nauru's Parliament, Anthony Audoa, MP, who said:
I don't know what is behind the mentality of the Australian leaders, but I don't think it is
right. A country that is so desperate with its economy, and you try to dangle a carrot in
front of them, of course, just like a prostitute ... if you dangle money in front of her, you
think she will not accept it. Of course she will, because she's desperate.
Id.; see also Mark Metherell & Michelle Grattan, Pacific Solution "'Treats Nations Like Prostitutes",
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Feb. 4, 2002, at 2.
132 Note that the "excision" from Australia's "migration zone" does no more than remove the ability
of non-citizens to lodge a refugee claim or make a valid application for a visa. See Migration Act 1958, §
46A (Austl.), together with § 5 (defining "excised off-shore places"); Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Border Protection: Australia's Excised Offshore Places-Q & A,
http://www.minister.insni.gov.au/borders/arrivals/excise.htm (last updated Aug. 2, 2002) (defining
"excised off-shore places" in the Migration Act 1958) [hereinafter Border Protection Q&A]. The changes
do not affect the nationality or entitlements of Australian citizens living on the islands. See Migration Act
1958, §§ 46A, 5; Border Protection Q&A.
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The most well-known of these centers was established at Guantanamo Bay,
a U.S. trust territory on the Island of Cuba.
133
The U.S. arrangements have other features that are echoed in the
Pacific Solution-among them the denial of access to U.S. refugee status
determination procedures and to the U.S. judicial system.'3 4  The United
States has enacted different legal regimes for persons detained away from its
mainland territories. 135  One notable feature of the U.S. legislation is that
there are provisions reducing or removing altogether the right of non-
citizens apprehended in this way to access U.S. administrative law
systems. A key aspect of the Pacific Solution was to replicate this
situation in Australia by removing the right of refugee claimants to appeal
adverse decisions to an administrative tribunal, thus removing access to both
lawyers and judicial review.' 
37
133 This facility became known as Camp X-Ray in late 2001, after being converted into a holding
facility for persons taken prison in Afghanistan during the early stages of the U.S. "War Against
Terrorism." GlobalSecurity.Org, Guantanamo Bay--Camp X-Ray,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/guantanamo-bay x-ray.htm (last modified Dec. 30, 2002).
134 See, e.g., The Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, Aliens and the Duty of
Nonrefoulement: Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (1993).
5 See MUSALO ET AL., supra note 48.
136 See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980), Immigration and Nationality
Act § 243(h), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1253(h) (1988), amending Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. §
243(h). Section 243(h) is the predecessor to what the 1996 Act redesignated as § 241(b)(3). T.A.
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP PROCESS AND POLICY 1033 (4th ed. 1998).
Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2001) ("The
Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum in accordance with the
requirements and procedures established by the Attorney General under this section if the Attorney General
determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A), [definition of a
refugee)."). Matter of Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311, 315 (BIA 1982). In Matter of Salim, the Board
explained the relationship between the asylum provision, § 208, and the withholding provision, then §
243(h) (redesignated as § 241(b)(3) in 1996):
Section 243(h) relief is "country specific" and accordingly, the applicant here would be presently
protected from deportation to Afghanistan pursuant to § 243(h). But that section would not
prevent his exclusion and deportation to Pakistan or any other hospitable country. .. if that
country will accept him. In contrast, asylum is a greater form of relief. When granted asylum,
the alien may be eligible to apply for adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident
pursuant to § 209 of the Act, after residing here one year, subject to numerical limitations and
the applicable regulations.
Id. Note that moves were also made to restrict the access of illegal entrants to appeal and judicial
review mechanisms. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996), 8 U.S.C. 1225, (Supp. 11 1997); and Karen Musalo et al.,
The Expedited Removal Study: Report On The First Three Years Of Implementation Of Expedited
Removal, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 130-45 (2001).
137 See Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Offshore Processing
Arrangements, Fact Sheet 76: Offshore Processing Arrangements, http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/76
offshore.htm (last updated Oct. 15, 2002).
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B. The Pacific Solution as a Tool for the Principled Management of
Refugee Flows
Before criticizing the scheme, it is worth reflecting briefly on the
rationales put forward by the Australian Government for its policy shift in
late 2001. Australia's primary justification for these arrangements again lies
in the argument that if the boat people seeking to find refuge in Australia can
meet the U.N. definition of refugee at all, they are "secondary flow"
refugees. 138  Their action in using the people smugglers to seek refuge in
Australia is described as either "forum shopping"-whereby the refugee
seeks out the country most likely to acknowledge her or his status as a
refugee-or as the search for a preferred "migration outcome."
139
The Australian Government argues that "secondary flow" refugees
should not be allowed to gain a procedural advantage by their forum
shopping activities. Minister Ruddock has drawn attention to the inequity
implicit in the fact that asylum seekers who access Australia's refugee
determination processes are many times more likely to gain recognition as
refugees than are those processed by the UNHCR in its front line field
operations. As well as being unfair to those "screened out" by the UNHCR,
the elaborate systems of countries like Australia are decried as magnets that
encourage asylum seekers to by-pass the "regular" refugee management
processes. 40 By the same token, it is argued that the international regime
for the protection of refugees should not be "corrupted" by allowing persons
who have protection in a safe country to use the asylum procedures of a
wealthy country to gain an immigration outcome.141
Put another way, the Australian Government seems to be arguing that
the best way to make the refugee determination mechanisms "principled" in
global terms, is to establish regimes that operate in a manner that reproduces
the field operations of the UNHCR in countries of first asylum. In practical
terms for the asylum seekers on Nauru and Manus Island, this has meant a
refugee determination regime markedly inferior to that operating on
mainland Australia.
:38 See People Smuggling Background Paper, supra note 8.
39 See Migration Act 1958, § 5 (Austl.) (migration zone defined); Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Ruddock Announces Tough New Initiatives,
http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media_releases/media99/r99143.htm (last updated July 22, 2002).
140 Id.
141 See, e.g., Alison Crosweller & Megan Saunders, Refugees' Plight a 'Lifestyle Choice',
AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 8, 2002, LEXIS, News Library (reporting that Phillip Ruddock, Immigration Minister,
claimed that asylum seekers travelling through Indonesia were "choosing to leave situations of safety and
security.").
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C. A Legal Critique of the Pacific Solution
After publishing his "modest proposal," Shuck met with pointed
criticisms from fellow academics Deborah Anker, Joan Fitzpatrick, and
Andrew Schaknove. 142 The three argue that the Shuck model would degrade
the Refugee Convention as a human rights instrument. By turning the plight
of refugees into an economic bargaining tool, wealthy states would be able
to take advantage of poorer states, forcing them to shoulder the burden of
caring for refugees in circumstances where they are likely to suffer in both
the short and long terms. The authors argue that "by emphasizing the
temporary nature of physical asylum and conferring it through voluntary
coalitions of states, the economic and social rights of refugees under the
Refugee Convention and Protocol will be de-emphasized."'
143
These criticisms of the Shuck proposal are borne out in the
experiences of asylum seekers in Nauru and on Manus Island in PNG. In
both places, asylum seekers have been held in detention with few rights to
communicate with anyone outside the camps. 144 All have been interviewed
by the UNHCR or by Australian officials with the aid of interpreters.
Although permitted to "appeal" adverse decisions by way of rehearing by
the same officials, the asylum seekers have been refused any form of legal
assistance. Attempts by public interest advocates to gain access to the
camps have proved futile, with Nauru refusing to grant visas to enter the
country, and PNG refusing access to Manus Island.
1 45
The involvement of the UNHCR and the IOM in the Pacific Solution
gives credence to Australia's formalistic assertions that the scheme is a tool
for the principled management of "secondary flow" refugees. Whether the
UNHCR and the IOM are content with the situation to which they are party,
however, is quite another question. My discussions with the UNHCR in
Canberra lead me to believe that the UNHCR would have been happy to
allow the Tampa asylum seekers access to legal advice and that it was
142 See Deborah Anker et al., Response: Crisis and Cure: A Reply to Hathaway/Neve and Schuck, 11
HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 295 (1998); see also Harvey Gee, The Refugee Burden: A Closer Look at the Refugee
Act of 1980, 26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 559 (2001).
I*43 See Anker et al., supra note 142, at 303.
i44 For one account, see Julian Burnside, Hypocrisy and Human Rights, at
http://www.julianburnside.com (last visited Jan. 19, 2003) (Deakin University Law School Oration 2002).
145 See id.
JANUARY 2003
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
Australia's opposition that led to the closure of the facilities to refugee
advocates.1
46
While the Tampa rescuees taken in by New Zealand fared well, the
arrangements on Nauru and Manus Island raise a variety of issues about
compliance with the rule of law-and arguably create more problems than
they solved. From the perspective of the Refugee Convention, the
arrangements on Nauru and Manus Island arguably constitute a penalty on
refugees contrary to Article 31 of the Refugee Convention. It is worth
noting in this context that Nauru is not a party to the Refugee Convention
and while PNG has signed, it has also made a number of reservations.
1 47
From the perspective of the domestic laws of both Nauru and PNG, the
establishment of the detention facilities and the indefinite incarceration of
the asylum seekers without judicial oversight are questionable. Both Nauru
and PNG are countries with Bills of Rights that prohibit arbitrary
detention. 148  Put simply, the financial inducements of the Australian
Government have resulted in the establishment of facilities that, at the very
least, sit uneasily with the human rights laws of the host governments.
The Australian Government has played word games when speaking of
the Pacific Solution arrangements. As Senior Judge Frank Brennan notes:
The Minister's first defence is to claim that the facilities in
those places (Nauru and Manus Island) are not detention centres
despite the Migration Legislation Amendment (Transitional
Movement) Act 2002 speaking of "the detention of the person
in a country in respect of which a declaration is in force (s.
198D(3)(c))." And the bills digest for the Migration
Legislation Amendment (Transitional Movement) Bill 2002
speaks of the removal of persons "to a place such as a 'Pacific
Solution' detention facility on Nauru or Papua New Guinea."
Even Senator George Brandis and Mr John Hodges in the
Senate Select Committee on a certain Maritime Incident have
referred to the "detention centres" in those places and the
146 Telephone Interview with Ellen Hansen, External Affairs Officer, UNHCR (Mar. 2002)
[hereinafter March Interview with Ellen Hansen].
147 Papua New Guinea does not accept the following Refugee Convention obligations: paid
employment (art. 17); housing (art. 21); public education (art. 22); freedom of movement (art. 26); non-
discrimination against refugees who enter illegally (art. 31); expulsion (art. 32); and naturalization (art. 34).
148 See NAURU CONST., art. 3, http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/paclawmat/Nauru_
legislation/NauruConstitution.htnil (preamble) (last visited Jan. 19, 2003); PAPUA N.G. CONST., pmbl. &
art. 42 (Liberty of the Person), http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/ paclawmat/PNG legislation/Constitution.htn
(last visited Jan. 19, 2003).
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"detainees" kept therein. In his evidence on 1 May 2002, Mr
Hodges said, "Nauru is by far the worst of the detention
centres." 149
The Australian Government has done its best to distance itself from
criticisms of the way the camps are being run and of the conditions in the
camps. Interestingly, these efforts do not appear to have succeeded in
deflecting criticisms of the Nauru and PNG facilities as manifestations of
Australian policy.
Aside from the extent to which the Pacific Solution represents a
breach of international law, the costs of the exercise to Australia in financial
terms have been considerable. According to the Minister's press releases,
four year funding for the operation costs of offshore processing has been
estimated at AUD 129.3 million for 2002-03, with an additional AUJD 270
million allocated for construction and operating costs for facilities on
Christmas and Cocos-Keeling islands. 150  As the Refugee Council of
Australia has noted,151 the budget allocations of AUD 2.8 billion over four
years represent expenditure in the vicinity of AUD 700,000 for each of a
nominal 4000 asylum seekers who may come to Australia by boat during
that period.
The Nauruan Government has been paid or pledged AUD 30 million
for the financial year of 2001-02.152 The arrangements in PNG are reported
to have cost in excess of AUD 24 million, with the number of asylum
seekers a mere 446.153 In practical terms, Australia used the interdicted
asylum seekers as barter for massive increases in aid payments to both
countries. In the case of PNG, the decision to trade refugees for Australian
aid has not gained popular support. Indeed, some have suggested that the
policy contributed to the dramatic decline in the fortunes of the governing
Peoples' Democratic Movement party, perhaps leading to the decision of
Prime Minister Sir Mekere Morauta to resign before the completion of the
elections in August 2002. Australia, some would argue, has emerged from
149 See Frank Brennan, Developing Just Refugee Policies in Australia: Local, National and
International Concerns 13 (Aug. 7, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, U. of Sydney) (on file with author).
150 See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Ministerial Press Release
No. 33 of 2002: Offshore Processing Developments and Related Savings,
http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media releases/index.htm (last updated May 14, 2002).
15' See Refugee Council of Australia, Reflections on the 2002-2003 Federal Budget, May 2002,
http://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/html/positionpapers/FEDERAL_BLIDGET.html (last visited Jan. 19,
2003).
:52 For a description of how this money is to be spent, see Adrift in the Pacific, supra note 39, at 13.
153 See Locals Question Benefits of Adopting "Pacific Solution " (ABC radio broadcast, Asia Pacific
Program, Nov. 2001); Adrift in the Pacific, supra note 39, at 10.
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the affair as a regional bully, using its financial muscle to force struggling..... +, s - A- - ,. A . .. - - 154
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As the refugee claims of the asylum seekers on Nauru and Manus
Island are processed, interesting issues emerge when the processing data
released by the UNHCR and by DIMIA are compared. The official statistics
released by the UNHCR on July 31, 2002, with respect to its Nauru
determinations, suggest that Iraqi asylum seekers on Nauru have been
accepted at the rate of about 84%. 155 The data released by DIMIA in May
2002 for Iraqis on Nauru shows Australia's approval of about 53%. The
recognition rates for Iraqis on Manus Island on May 20, 2002 were about
76%. As DIMIA has not released statistics with the same breakdown as the
UNHCR, it is difficult to follow exactly what is going on. However, the
available data suggests that the UNHCR processing is more generous than
that of the Australian authorities on Nauru and PNG. Indeed, on the face of
things, the UNHCR processing appears to be more in line with the
processing of Iraqis in Australia (including appeals to the Refugee Review
Tribunal), which results in approvals of Iraqi claimants at well over 80%.
As noted earlier,' 56 one of the stated rationales of the Pacific Solution is that
the Australian on-shore processing system is too generous relative to
standards set by the UNHCR. Minister Ruddock's claim in late 2001 was
that an Iraqi asylum seeker was "six times more likely" to gain recognition
in Australia than through UNHCR processes. In the case of asylum seekers
on Nauru and Manus Island, the statistics supplied by the UNHCR-
although not those emanating from the Government-suggest that
processing by the UNHCR was, in fact, more likely to result in the
recognition of claims than offshore processing by the Australian authorities.
154 See Duncan Kerr, True Believers Will Reject Wedge Politics, NEWCASTLE HERALD, Feb. 13, 2002,
LEXIS, News Library.
... See Table 1, infra.
156 See discussion, supra Part IV.B.
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Table 1. UNHCR Refugee Status Determinations for Nauru as of
July 31, 200257
Nationality Total No. Accept 1st Rejected 1st Accept Reject Pending Voluntary Acceptance
- Persons Instance Instance Appeal Appeal Repatriation Rateb
Iraqi 201 126 75 36 31 8 84%
Palestinian 27 14 13 10 3 89%
Afghan 292' 32 244 239 5 12%5
Pakistani 3 3 0%
Sri Lankan 6 5 2 3 1 40%
Total 529 172 339 46 37 247 9 43%
Resettlement: 59 departed to New Zealand; 5 departed to Australia; and 9 accepted by Sweden, not yet departed.
Fourteen Afghans were resettled to New Zealand without receiving a determination. Two
Afghans chose to repatriate without receiving a determination.
b Acceptance rate is calculated as a percentage of decisions (not counting pending cases &
voluntary repatriation without determination). This is of particular note in the large number of pending
decisions for the Afghan caseload.
Table 2. Australian Government Refugee Determinations: Decisions
Handed Down on Nauru, MPS 41/2002, May 30, 2002158
Ira i Other Nationalities
Approved Refused Approved Refused Total
Decisions handed down during the week
commencing May 27, 2002 10 49 3 0 62
Decisions previously handed down
Australia 60 12 0 7 79
UNHCR 126 75 21 22 244
Total 196 136 24 29 1 385
Table 3. Australian Government Refugee Determinations: Decisions




Ira i Other Nationalities
Approved Refused Approved Refused Total
Decisions handed down during the week
commencing May 20, 2002 115 56 7 11 189
Decisions previously handed down 101 12 3 0 116
Total 216 68 10 11 305
157 Statistical data supplied by Ellen Hansen, External Affairs Officer, UNHCR, Canberra, Austl.
Note that this statistical data does not include the 131 Afghans from the Tampa that were sent to New
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many aspects of the Pacific Solution that depart from what he proposed.
Even so, it is interesting to note that within one year of its inception, the
Australian Government seems ready to draw a line under the Pacific
Solution. In truth, the arrangements on Nauru and Manus Island are not
sustainable. Indeed, every indication is that the measures were taken as a
short-term solution to the panic surrounding the Tampa Incident and its
aftermath. The IOM and the UNHCR pointedly declined to take on the
processing of any more boat people apprehended in the Pacific region en
route for Australia after the Tampa and Aceng. Other Pacific Islands also
refused to take on processing for Australia.1 60 If there is a future for the
Pacific Solution, it lies in the detention facility planned for Christmas Island;
this, it would appear, is to be Australia's Guantanamo Bay.
1 61
V. LANDFALL AT LAST? THE PLIGHT OF "UNAUTHORIZED" REFUGEES AND
"TRANSTIONAL MOVEMENT" PERSONS IN AUSTRALIA
As processing on Nauru and Manus Island nears completion, the issue
of who is to take those recognized as refugees presents a problem. The tiny
island of Nauru has made it plain from the outset that it will not accept any
of the Tampa or Aceng refugees for permanent resettlement. PNG is also
not well placed to take refugees for resettlement. New Zealand and Sweden
have accepted some, but Australia has been reluctant to follow suit.
Although it has accepted forty-two refugees from Manus Island, as of July 1,
2002, Australia had only taken one refugee from Nauru. This is in spite of
the fact that half of the refugees first recognized by the UNHCR on Nauru
are reputed to have relatives of some sort in Australia.'
62
The dilemma facing the Pacific Solution refugees highlights once
again the limits of the international protection regime on the one hand and
the iniquity of Australia's policies, on the other. The bottom line is that the
UNHCR cannot force countries to accept refugees. Its Executive Committee
has examined the problems associated with the dislocation of refugees'
families. In the Executive Committee's Conclusion No. 24 ("ExComm 24"),
60 A variety of Pacific Island States were approached by Australia in 2001, among them Tuvalu and
Kiribati. See Adrift in the Pacific, supra note 39.
161 Funding for the establishment of a permanent detention facility was allocated in the Federal
Budget of May 2002. See Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Contract
Signed for Christmas Island Detention Facility, Jun. 17, 2002, http://www.immi.gov.au/media-releases/
media02/d02037.htm.
162 See March Interview with Ellen Hansen, supra note 146.
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the UNHCR has called upon States Parties to the Refugee Convention to
make the reunification of refugee families a first priority. 163 In Australia, the
public response of at least one senior Departmental official has been to reject
ExComm 24 as "not relevant" to the issue of Australia's legal obligations./64
There is a special irony in Australia's unwillingness to take the Pacific
Solution refugees. Absent changes to Australian laws in 1999, it is arguable
that many of the refugees on Nauru and Manus Island would never have had
to resort to the people smugglers and their boats to seek safe haven in the
first place.
Until 1999, when Australia's first Border Protection Act was passed,
all non-citizens recognized as refugees in Australia were treated in the same
way. All received permanent residence, with all the entitlements flowing
from that status. In that year, changes to the Migration Regulations meant
that boat people and other unauthorized arrivals would no longer gain access
to permanent residence or to the attendant rights to (legal) family
reunification. These provisions were introduced in spite of, or perhaps
because of the fact that more boat people were gaining recognition as
refugees in 1999 than in any other time in Australian history. The almost
immediate result of the amendment was to change the usual pattern of
migration.
Previously, the common practice was to send the male (head) of the
family by boat to find safe haven, using the people smugglers. That way the
father would suffer the rigors and perils of the sea voyage and the women
and children would follow in due course using the regular immigration
mechanisms. Since the amendment, the inability to sponsor family has
forced refugee families away from the regular migration channel and into the
arms of the people smugglers. If families do not use the people smugglers,
the present system in Australia means that they could well face permanent
separation. This change is reflected in the composition of the detention
center population.' 65 In 1999, the number of children in custody leapt from
5% to 34% in the space of a month.1
66
163 See Conclusion on the International Protection of Refugees, No. 24 (XXXII): 1981 Family
Reunification, UNHCR Executive Comm., 32d Sess., reprinted in GOODWfN-GILL, supra note 30, at 475;
also available at http://www.unhcr.ch.
164 April Interview with Robert Illingworth, supra note 19.
165 Australia is one of very few countries that detains all asylum seekers who enter the country
without a visa, with very few exceptions. See Anthony M. North & Peace Decle, Courts and Immigration
Detention: "Once a Jolly Swagman Camped by a Billabong," 10 AUSTL. J. ADMIN. L. 1 (2002); and
Crock, Stronger than Razor Wire, supra note 108 (discussing Australian laws).
166 This statement derives from tallying the number of children and adults arriving on boats, as
recorded by Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. See Fact Sheet 74a,
supra note 91.
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With the passage of the Migration Legislation Amendment
(Transitional Movement) Act in 2002, the Government has attempted to
cement its vision of refugee processing with legislation that allows people
processed offshore to be brought to Australia without gaining any rights to
apply for a visa or to challenge their detention. For most purposes,
individuals brought to Australia under this legislation are treated as though
they are not legally present in the country. For those who have family in
Australia, this represents particular problems.
Although nominally processed outside Australian law, asylum seekers
on Nauru and Manus Island are technically subject to the same refugee law
standards as those used for refugee claimants within Australia. Although
Australia has never moved to enact the U.N. definition into its migration
laws, on September 26, 2001 the Migration Act was amended so as to
"clarify"--or, rather, constrain-the way Australian decision makers are
supposed to read the U.N. definition of refugee.1 67 The amended legislation
directs that families cannot be regarded as a "particular social group" for the
purposes of the definition. Put simply, it is no longer permissible to take
into account persecution suffered by one family member when determining
the claim of another in the family: each applicant must meet the definition
in her or his own right. For women and children, the changes mean that
their refugee claims will fail unless they have a political profile of their own
or they are with their husbands or fathers at the time of applying.
At the end of 2002, there remained women and children in Woomera
detention center with husbands on the outside who had come on earlier boats
and who had gained recognition as refugees. Where the women's claims are
rejected, the only solution seems to be for the refugee husbands to go to the
Minister personally to get permission to lodge another refugee application,
this time including the wives and children. In the meantime, the women and
children face possible removal as they languish in detention.
For those outside of Australia, however, even this is not an option.
The husbands and fathers recognized as refugees in Australia cannot lodge
fresh refugee applications that include their family on one form. Moreover,
if rejected, the family offshore cannot be helped, even if they are brought to
Australia in transit under the Transitional Movement provisions. In these
cases, the refugee fathers and husbands have two options. They will either
have to abandon their attempt to find safe haven, returning with their
families to face persecution. Or, they will be forced to stand by and watch
167 See Migration Legislation Amendment Act, No. 6, 2001 (Austl.), inserting § 91S into the
Migration Act 1958 (Austl.).
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as their families are returned without them. As "voluntary" returnees,
Australia could avoid the direct charge of refouling the refugee fathers and
husbands. Whether this scenario is in keeping with the spirit, rather than the
letter, of the Refugee Convention is questionable.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the Tampa Incident begins to fade into history, questions remain
about what exactly caused Australia to react as it did in August 2001.
Conspiracy theories that assert the whole affair was orchestrated for political
ends cannot provide the whole answer. Assertions that Australia is a racist
society, locked in a protectionist and alarmist mindset by its refusal to face
the ghosts of its white supremacist past also tend to result in caricature rather
than characterization. However, the way the government of the day played
events undoubtedly did contribute to its victory at the polls in the election of
2001.
The Tampa Incident did have its roots deep in Australian culture-a
culture that includes fear, isolationism, and xenophobia. However, it was
also an event-or series of events-carved out at a particularly fraught
moment in human history. It should be recalled that the first instance
decision of Justice North in the Tampa litigation was handed down only
hours before the first plane hit the World Trade Center in New York on
September 11 th. While the complexity of the causative factors may not
exonerate Australia, nor excuse the on-going defects in its refugee policies,
it must be acknowledged that the Incident cannot be adequately explained in
the two-minute sound-bites favored by the modern media.
First, there is something about boat people that excites extraordinary
reactions in people. In this, Australia is far from unique. Perhaps it is a
primordial fear of invading hordes. Perhaps it is that water borders are more
obvious than land borders, making territorial incursions from the sea more
keenly felt. Certainly, the constant talk of numbers cannot help, including
statements such as "twenty million of concern to UNHCR," or "more on the
move than in any other time of human history." Mention has been made of
the United States' Haitian interdiction program, and of the extreme lengths
to which the United States has gone to prevent seafaring asylum seekers
from landing on its territory. Less extreme examples of countries reacting to
the arrival or threatened arrival of boat people abound. In many instances
the responses are quite disproportionate to the threats posed by the unwanted
arrivals. For example, in 1999 rumors that a boat may be making its way to
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New Zealand led to the enactment of immigration detention laws. 16 8 Even
compassionate Canada has responded with unusual defensiveness when
faced with the arrival of boats carrying asylum seekers.
69
Putting to one side the invasion fears, the second complicating factor
is the complexity of the people smuggling story. The asylum seekers who
arrive by boat in Australia, as in other parts of the world, do so using people
smugglers. As well as implicating the fugitives in criminal and often highly
exploitative activities, the people smugglers help to blur the line between
asylum seeker and economic migrant. As the Australian Government is
quick to emphasize, the boat people arriving in Australia are very rarely
coming directly from the country in which they fear persecution. In most
cases, they have traveled through several other countries. Sometimes they
have tried to find refuge in the countries they passed through; sometimes
their voyage has been more or less direct. There is often a grain of truth in
even the most alarmist rhetoric in those seeking to vilify the asylum seeker.
The use of leaky boats as the vehicle for conveying refugees to
Australia must be a matter of concern, and something to discourage-if only
to ensure no more tragedies like the one that saw 353 people lose their lives
off the Indonesian coast in late October 2001. However, it is equally clear
that the Pacific Solution is no solution to people smuggling. While there are
families striving to be reunited, while there are people caught in limbo
yearning for a safe haven, the refugees will continue to batter at Australia's
door. It is no solution to decry the refugee's efforts to save themselves and
their families or to vilify the victims who take the initiative to struggle
against the oppression in their lives. It is no solution to adopt policies that
perpetuate and exacerbate suffering in the name of "control" and deterrence.
The injustice of the Tampa Incident, Operation Relex, and the Pacific
Solution resonate in the silence that has surrounded the refugees and asylum
seekers on Nauru and Manus Island. The conflicting interpretations of the
law-both domestic and international-that have emerged in the wake of the
Tampa may be testament to the inadequacies of the legal framework for the
protection of refugees. Another view may be that the legal sophistry
surrounding the Incident and its aftermath says more about the meanness of
the human spirit than it does about the law. It is fitting to recall that the
168 See Immigration Act of 1987, § 128(13B) (N.Z.), and the discussion in Roger Haines, An
Overview of Refugee Law in New Zealand: Background and Current Issues, Mar. 10, 2000,
http://www.refugee.org.nz/IARLJ3-OOHaines.html (paper presented to Inaugural Meeting of International
Association of Refugee Law Judges).
169 See Judith Kumin, Between Sympathy and Anger: How Open Will Canada's Door Be?, in
U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY (2000), available at
http://www.refiugees.org/world/articles/wrs00_sympathy.htn (last visited Jan. 18, 2003).
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essence of refugee protection is the recognition of common humanity on the
one hand, and the showing of mtcy on the other. In the words of the
Tampa refugees-as refugees they were in August 200 1:
You know well about the long time war [in Afghanistan] and its
tragic human consequences and you know about the genocide
and massacres going on in our country and thousands of us
innocent men, women and children were put in public
graveyards, and we hope that you understand that keeping view
of above mentioned reasons we have no way but to run out of
our dear homeland and to seek a peaceful asylum .... We do
not know why we have not been regarded as refugees and
deprived from rights of refugees according to International
Convention (1951).
We request from Australian authorities and people, at
first not to deprive us from the rights that all refugees enjoy in
your country. In the case of rejection due to not having
anywhere to live on the earth and every moment death is
threatening us. We request you to take mercy on the life of 438
men, women and children.
170
70 Vadarlis v. Ruddock (2001) 110 F.C.R. 452, 459, overruled by Ruddock v. Vadarlis (2001) 110
F.C.R. 491.
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